XIV
If the war you are talking about today had been dealt with from the beginning through reason and logic and without excitement, it would not have grown so in dimension or ferocity.
-Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War
Looking at the volatile political problems of today's Middle East, one wonders if solutions can be found. The editorial pages of Western newspapers reveal that both governments and independent Middle East experts are puzzled by the phenomenon of "Islamic fundamentalism" the dynamics of its growth and its prospects. This chapter will address three traditional alternatives to religious fundamentalism in the region--nationalism, liberalism, and Marxism--and examine the reasons for their failures.
For most Middle Eastern countries-except those, such as Iran, that had a distinct and independent geographical and historical identity the "nation state" is a relatively recent phenomenon which came into being when these countries gained independence in the early decades of the twentieth century, after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Arab nationalism began with Arab movements seeking independence from foreign occupation near the end of the nineteenth century and grew with the writings of that century's renowned Muslim writers, such as Rafi'at Tahtawi, Nadim, and Muhammad Abdoh.
In successive decades, nationalism played an important role in all the region's countries and was the guiding principle of the ideology of many ruling or powerful parties in the Middle East. A wide spectrum of governments, including that of Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt, Dr. Muhammad Mossadeq in Iran, Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) in Turkey, and the Ba'ath parties in Iraq and Syria, adopted nationalism as the ideological basis of their rule. Regional and international developments, however, have gradually reduced the power of nationalism in the Arab world and the Middle East. Never have the ranks of the Arab states been so divided; never has the ideal of Arab unity seemed so remote.
This weakening of a fundamental ingredient of Arab politics created an opportunity for the growth of nationalism's traditional, but hitherto subordinate, rival in these countries, Islamic fundamentalism. Although the fundamentalists had always lagged behind nationalist movements at critical junctures in the region's modern history, such as the oil nationalization movement in Iran in 1950-53, the Suez Canal crisis in 1956, and the Bangladesh War in 1971, the picture is now changing dramatically.
As a social institution, democracy is another new arrival to the Middle East. Vast areas of this region remained for centuries under the despotic rule of the Ottoman sultans. Those countries not under Ottoman rule were under monarchic dictatorships. Even the 1906 Constitutional Revolution in Iran did little to democratize that country.
Among the various factors sociologists cite in explaining this lack of democracy, the most important is the social and economic underdevelopment of the middle class. Since most of these societies were originally feudal and at the same time subject to colonial rule or domination, the bourgeoisie in Middle Eastern societies were essentially traders and merchants, unlike European capitalists, many of whom were the owners of industries. Dependent on the goodwill of large landowners and the traditional, conservative clergy, the Middle East middle class was unable to represent the advanced demands of the liberal bourgeoisie or to aspire to realize them.
The birth of the bourgeoisie in these societies therefore miscarried, resulting in the creation of middle classes that, unlike their European counterparts, had no strong representatives to defend their rights and values. The entrepreneurial class that did emerge almost always allied itself with, or acquiesced to, dictatorships. In Iran, whether under the shah or during Khomeini's rule, this social group has always acted as an appendage of the ruling regime. The primary victims of this lack of an autonomous, enlightened, and distinct middle class were democratic and parliamentary institutions.
Common factors such as cultural stagnation, rampant illiteracy, and the tradition of blind submission to authority aggravated this situation. The periodic crises of Western democracies (the emergence of Fascism and Nazism in the 1930s and the reluctance of some Western powers to adapt themselves to the realities of the postcolonial era in the 1960s) had a significant impact. Consequently, liberal trends in Muslim countries were generally discredited. This may explain why, when the status quo collapsed in Eastern Europe, societies there have moved in the direction of parliamentarism and democracy, whereas when the old order begins to crumble in the Middle East, no society begins building democratic structures.
Despite the traditional lack of democracy, however, the yearning for freedom has persisted among the people of the Middle East. Whenever an opportunity for revolt against despotic rulers has presented itself, the people have spared nothing, not even their lives, to attain their ideals. The 1906 Constitutional Revolution in Iran and similar political up' heavals in other Middle Eastern countries attest to this reality.
Some countries, including Iran, Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan, have nevertheless experienced periods of relative liberalism during this century; but the sociopolitical weaknesses of democracy's advocates have led to the failure of almost all of these experiences. Ironically, these very weaknesses have allowed the Muslim fundamentalists to expand their sphere of influence among the impoverished, traditional urban dwellers. Had the liberal nationalists been capable of establishing durable democratic institutions, improving political awareness, and guaranteeing such essential rights as freedom of speech and association, they could have reversed the trend, limiting the fundamentalists' appeal to small, uneducated, and ultra traditionalist sectors. But due to their fundamental shortcomings, indigenous liberals in the Middle East have been and remain incapable of and disinclined to introduce a genuine democratic alternative that could realize democracy and freedom.
From the very beginning, the political forces allied with the Communist Bloc and the former Soviet Union never inspired much enthusiasm among the people, primarily due to the region's profound religious beliefs and sentiments. The limited advances that Marxist-oriented political forces made in some countries during the 1960s and '70s were reversed when the shah fell and an Islamic fundamentalist regime took power in Iran. As fundamentalists began to rise, the Marxists declined. Ultimately, the Soviet Union's disintegration virtually ended their social and political influence.
Although Marxism was essentially unappealing to the masses, political parties that looked to Moscow for inspiration played an active role in some countries from the Second World War until the 1980s, because of the increasing role the Soviet Union played in Middle Eastern politics. In Iran, the communist Tudeh (masses) Party offered its complete support to the "anti-Imperialist Imam Khomeini," officially sanctioning the execution and suppression of the Mojahedin, collaborating with repressive organizations such as the Guards Corps, and spying on the Mojahedin.
For all its attempts at currying favor with the mullahs, however, the Tudeh Party never became a serious contender in post-shah Iran. After the revolution, the Mojahedin emerged as the largest opposition party in the country. The Tudeh Party was unable to shake off its image as a hated and powerless appendage in Iranian politics, particularly as the Mojahedin exposed its treacherous policies, past and present. The Tudeh consequently never got off the ground, and no one mourned the party's political death in 1983, when all its leaders surrendered to the regime.
During the 1980s, governments in the region dependent on the Soviet Bloc gradually changed their orientation. For example, South Yemen, the sole Marxist government in the Arab world, successfully merged with North Yemen and accepted the economic system of its neighbor and longtime rival.
The demise of communist-influenced parties and regimes created a vacuum at one end of the Middle East's political spectrum: the segment that had traditionally acted as a focal point for dissident intellectuals, students, and impoverished blue- and white-collar workers. Had democratic alternatives existed, they could have easily attracted these social forces and become the cornerstones of consensus governments. In the absence of such alternatives, however, the reactionaries and Islamic fundamentalists became de facto winners after Eastern Europe's collapse and communism's demise.
In summing up, it is appropriate to point to two misinterpretations of Islamic fundamentalism in the West. Some contend that the emergence of fundamentalism is merely a by-product of poverty and the unequal distribution of wealth. They argue, therefore, that social and political reforms can curb and even eliminate fundamentalism. Without question, fundamentalists take full advantage of social deprivation. But at least in this part of the world, fundamentalism should not be viewed merely as a function of economic factors. All of the elements contributing to the crises that plague the region, such as poverty and bureaucratic corruption, were in place in the 1970s. Prior to the mullahs' coming to power in Iran and their export of fundamentalism, however, fundamentalist groups had never developed beyond isolated religious sects. The historical, social, and cultural roots of this phenomenon must not be overlooked.
Without confronting fundamentalism in political and cultural terms -and that means first of all coming face-to-face with the mullahs' regime in Tehran-not much can be achieved. In recent years, the mullahs' rise to power in Iran has played a key role in opening the way for fundamentalism's expansion. Khomeini swept into power on a genuine wave of popular religious sentiments and revived religious demagogy.
Another erroneous perception, sometimes encountered in the West, is the suggestion that the Islamic fundamentalists' rise to power is not necessarily a negative development; it could be a step in Islamic society's progress toward democracy. This interpretation, beyond being ethnocentric, is extremely dangerous because the logical next step is appeasement of the fundamentalists. It further reveals a profound misunderstanding of the religious nature of Khomeini and is equivalent to suggesting that Fascism and Nazism in Europe in the 1930s "contributed" to Europe's progress toward democracy. Perhaps, but only after a world war, millions of victims, and the greatest catastrophe in human history. To argue that fundamentalism is "natural" to Middle Eastern development is an insult to the dignity and history of the Middle Eastern peoples.
Islamic fundamentalism is based upon a medieval and totalitarian ideology. It interferes in the most trivial personal matters of the citizenry, imposing a repressive system that eliminates all avenues for free political, social, and economic activities. Furthermore, owing to its nature, this ideology recognizes no geographic boundaries and, therefore, elevates the export of revolution, crisis, and disruption of all norms of international relations to the top of its agenda.
Has not the experience of the mullahs' regime-which continues executions and torture after fourteen years in power, and which uses any opportunity to export terrorism and fundamentalism and to undermine all peace initiatives in the region-been sufficient?*
