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Since the enemy has atomic facilities, Islamic countries must be armed with the same capacity.
-Ata'ollah Mohajerani, Iranian Vice President, October 19911
Following the 1988 Iran, Iraq ceasefire, Western observers argued that Iran would immediately embark upon rebuilding its economy, devastated after eight years of war, or at least give reconstruction top priority. Tehran's boisterous propaganda echoed this theme.
But not only did the mullahs fail to revive the crippled economy, they continued to give precedence to upgrading their war machine. Iranian leaders began a major and rapid military procurement program, including an ambitious effort to acquire nuclear weapons.
Rafsanjani's 1989 five-year economic plan allocated some $50 billion to military expenditures. By 1992, Iran's military spending was 40 percent more than it had been at the peak of the Iran-Iraq War.2
The mullahs' military hardware buying binge goes far beyond their defense needs. According to Jane's Defense Weekly, "There are at least 240 major, state-owned plants producing military equipment and an estimated 12,000 privately owned workshops manufacturing military related products."3 Informed analysts and sources say that in expanding its military, industrial base, the regime in Tehran "has been assisted by the former Soviet Union, North Korea, China, Pakistan, Argentina, Brazil, and Germany."4 Other major suppliers of arms to Iran include Belgium, Sweden, Taiwan, Italy, India, Poland, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Romania.
Tehran has aimed its arms spree in three directions: conventional arms, chemical and biological weapons, and nuclear technology.
During the past three years the Iranian regime has bought $3 billion in arms from North Korea. In October and November 1991 alone it "purchased 150 Scud missiles from that country."5 The North Koreans also delivered 170 more advanced Scud- Band C missiles.6 China has also been indispensable in developing Iran's missile production capabilities.7 As part of a $5 billion weapons agreement in 1989, China agreed to sell Tehran parts that could be used for medium-range ballistic missiles.8 In addition, the Iranians are to receive from Syria 170 Scud-D missiles, with a range of 1,200 kilometers.9 The Chinese have reportedly sold Tehran M-11 missiles with a range of 1,000 kilometers. The Defense Ministry announced in January 1992 that the defense industries would begin mass producing long-range surface-to-surface missiles with high destructive power. The missiles are reported to be an upgraded SS-l 'Scud-B' with extra fuel tanks and a reduced warhead payload. 10
The former Soviet Union and China have also provided Tehran with advanced fighters and bombers, including 12 F-7 fighters, 25 SU-24 bombers and 30 top-of-the-line MiG-29s.11 Presently, the Guards Corps is using a $14 million credit with China to obtain spare parts for 500 BMP - 1 armored fighting vehicles.
The collapse of the former Soviet Union has prompted Tehran to obtain various types of weapons for the lowest possible prices from Soviet successor states. Following his trip to Russia in December 1991, Foreign Minister Velayati returned with a suitcase full of contracts for weapons purchases.12 For example, the Russian Federation has a $4 billion contract to deliver to Iran 48 MiG-29 fighters, 500 T-72 main battle tanks, and other types of weapons, including SA- 5 surface-to-air missiles and 122mm howitzer and the l30mm gun.13 The Associated Press reported that "the Soviet Union and its successor states transferred more than a billion dollars worth of military equipment to Iran in 1991. It is expected that there will be more than a billion dollars worth of deliveries in 1992."14 In addition, Russia is to provide Iran with spare parts, armaments, and operating manuals for the estimated 115 Iraqi jets that flew to Iran during the Gulf War.15 A number of Iranian pilots received MiG-29 and Sukhoi training in Russia.
According to an agreement signed with the Russian Federation in March 1992, another 400 advanced T-72 tanks worth $720 million were to be delivered to the Revolutionary Guards Corps. Furthermore, the Guards Corps has agreed to pay $175 million for 500 BMP- 2 armored 130 fighting vehicles equipped with laser-guided antitank missiles. Officials from the Russian Federation have also reportedly visited Tehran to assure the Iranians of their cooperation in transferring the technology to build and assemble T-72 tanks. Iran's T- 72 version will include some of the weaponry and equipment of the more modern Soviet T-80 main battle tank, such as the night vision system and the reactive armour.16 This contract is said to be worth $9 billion, stretching over several years. The mullahs have bought another 1,500 T-55 tanks from Poland,17 and 15,000 DCA rocket launchers and 2,000 surface-to-air missile launch pads from Bulgaria.18
Tehran is also aiming to revitalize its naval force, devastated during the eight-year war with Iraq. Separate deals with China and Russia will give Iran its first attack submarines and fast-moving warships equipped with anti-ship missiles. The Russians have agreed to deliver two Kilo-class diesel-powered submarines valued at about $600 million. 19 The crews for the boats are training in a Russian-controlled naval base in Latvia.2O In addition to an option to buy a third Kilo submarine, Tehran has negotiated a deal to purchase five 40O-ton mini submarines from Moscow. In late 1992, the Iranians also discussed with Russia the purchase of two additional Kilo-class diesel submarines. The defense minister, Akbar Torkan, began negotiations for more submarines after completing payment for three Kilos ordered earlier.21 Reports in the Iranian media indicate that the vessels will be based at the southern port of Chah Bahar along the Gulf of Oman.22 The mullahs have not restricted their buying spree to the Chinese, the North Koreans, or the former Eastern Bloc. According to Defense Week, "a contract with Brazil for 15 military cargo aircraft and 15 Tucanos was fulfilled in 1991."23 In fact, Iran has replaced Iraq as Brazil's main Middle East customer for arms.24
Chemical and Biological Weapons
In addition to its vast conventional weapons procurement program, Tehran has actively sought to produce chemical and biological weapons. Rafsanjani has acknowledged: "We must fully equip ourselves with chemical, biological, and radioactive weapons."25 Procurement and stockpiling of chemical weapons has been on the agenda of the Revolutionary Guards Corps. In 1991, German intelligence services reported that Iran was in possession of a blueprint the Germans used to build the Rabata chemical arms factory in Libya. Experts believe that Tehran will produce modern chemical weapons in the late 1990s.26
Recent reports on the hitherto undisclosed aspects of the mullahs' efforts to procure biological and chemical weapons show that with foreign assistance, the Tehran regime has made very dangerous advances in these areas. In cooperation with foreign governments in such countries as China and North Korea and a number of European-including German-firms, the Guards Corps is now able to produce chemical weapons, nerve gases, and biological weapons. It has stockpiled large quantities of such weapons of mass destruction. The Guards Corps also possesses the technology to mount chemical warheads on long-range Scud missiles. Currently, the regime has set up chemical plants in four regions of the country and is training the Revolutionary Guards on how to use chemical weapons.27
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In 1992, the Guards Corps expanded its chemical weapons sites. The strictly confidential nature of the program has meant that only a limited number of people are aware of them. Rafsanjani has appointed his close confidants to supervise these plans, and they report to him directly.
The Guards Corps, Ministry of Defense, and Engineering Research Center of Jahad-e-Sazandegi (the Construction Crusade) are working together on a chemical weapons complex on a site fourteen kilometers west of Tehran, near the Tehran-Karaj Highway. The Engineering Research Center of the Construction Crusade oversees the main production sites of chemical materials in the country.
The Karaj program is highly confidential, and Chinese experts supervise the progress of the work. A large number of Chinese engineers and military experts cooperate with the Guards Corps on the site. The regime intends to transfer its best experts to this location.
Razi Serum and Vaccine Production Center
A special team is working secretly at the Razi Serum and Vaccine Production Center in Karaj. The center is situated on the Qazvin-Hessarak Highway. The team is carrying out its research on biological weapons under the supervision of the Guards Corps.
All the laboratories and experts of this corporation work under the supervision of the Revolutionary Guards Corps' Chemical Warfare Unit. Since the days of the Iran-Iraq War, the corporation has been producing materials needed by the Guards' Chemical Warfare Unit.
The corporation's main production facility is situated in Bandar, Khomeini in southwest Iran. The corporation's central offices are located in the building of the Oil Ministry's Petrochemical Industries Establishment. The corporation works independently of the Oil Ministry.
The center is involved specifically in the production of mustard gas for the Guards Corps. There are also research facilities and large laboratories. A big fire broke out in the center in 1987, leaving 400 dead. It is situated in Marvdasht, in Fars Province in southern Iran.
The corporation operates ostensibly as an ordinary commercial venture administered by the Bonyad-e-Mostaz'afin (Foundation for the Deprived), but is, in fact, one of the principal chemical gas production facilities of the Guards Corps.
The production center is forty-five kilometers from Isfahan on the Isfahan-Mobarakeh Highway. There are offices on Isfahan's Seyyed Alikhan Street, and the central office is on Tehran's Gandhi Street.
Nuclear arms, in the mullahs' view, are "the most strategic guarantee" for their survival in the future of the region. In 1991, Ata'ollah Mohajerani, one of Rafsanjani's deputies, also laid emphasis on the need to obtain atomic weapons. "Since the enemy has atomic facilities," he said, "Islamic countries must be armed with the same capacity." As the majlis speaker in 1989, Rafsanjani underscored the need to obtain an atomic arsenal, stressing that Iran cannot ignore the reality of the modem world's atomic weapons.
The efforts by the mullahs' regime to develop a nuclear arsenal date back to 1985, when Tehran revived the nuclear program that was abandoned with the fall of the shah in 1979. A special section within the Revolutionary Guards Corps was assigned the task of overseeing scientific research and of securing nuclear technology for military use.28 To that end, the facilities of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization (IAEO) were placed under the control of the Guards Corps, whose first order of business was to set up new installations hidden from the view of international observers.
The mullahs reached agreement with Argentina in 1987 to obtain a supply of 20-percent enriched uranium to be used in Tehran's Amirabad research center, which has a five-megawatt nuclear reactor. They also struck deals with both Argentina and Pakistan for the training of nuclear specialists.29 In 1988, when the regime reluctantly accepted the ceasefire in the Iran-Iraq War, the Guards Corps accelerated the IAEO's activities. It launched a top-secret project code-named the "Great Plan." Its initial budget was $200 million, and the project has been extensively funded ever since.30 In 1992, they allocated $800 million to the project. In addition, a department in the Ministry of Defense was put in charge of acquiring nuclear-related technology from abroad. Two Iranian nuclear experts supervised the project.
Following Khomeini's death in 1989, Rafsanjani aggressively pursued the development of Iran's nuclear capabilities, attempting to attract nuclear scientists and specialists back to Iran by offering them substantial salaries. He also sought to secure nuclear equipment and technology from foreign countries. Nevertheless, the Guards Corps encountered serious difficulties because the efforts to obtain fuel and technology made little progress. Subsequently, a meeting was held in early 1990 between Rafsanjani, Mohsen Rezaii, the Guards Corps commander in chief, and other senior officials involved in the nuclear project, to assess the progress and prospects of Iran's nuclear program. Afterward, Rafsanjani issued directives to step up the efforts to obtain technology and other necessary equipment from a variety of countries, including China, Pakistan, Argentina, and France.
In the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War, when Germany informed Tehran that it would no longer continue its nuclear assistance to the mullahs' regime, Rafsanjani intervened personally. He vowed in public that the Islamic Republic would pursue its bid to acquire nuclear technology and warned Germany of losing Iran's markets.
In 1992, Rafsanjani met with a visiting official from China's Council of Science and Technology, the Chinese organization responsible for nuclear programs. Subsequently, a ten-year pact was signed between the two countries for scientific cooperation and the transfer of military technology.31 Trusted Iranian experts were also dispatched to Europe and elsewhere to infiltrate nuclear research institutions and later repatriate their knowledge to Iran.32 By mid- 1992, Tehran had succeeded in signing an agreement with the Russian Federation to obtain two 440-megawatt nuclear reactors and buying a Calutron-type uranium-enrichment device from China. It also obtained a Cyclotron from the Belgian firm Ion Beam Applications. Although the company maintains that the equipment is generally used in medical research, nuclear industry experts say that "it could be adapted to enrich uranium."33
On his trip to China in September 1992, Rafsanjani took along ten Iranian nuclear experts. These experts have been undergoing training since. In addition, another twenty specialists are completing their training in China.
The primary objective of this trip was to obtain greater Chinese cooperation on technology and equipment and the dispatch of more Chinese nuclear experts to Iran. Rafsanjani's key nuclear goal during this trip and meetings with the Chinese president and officials was to speed up the completion of a nuclear center in southern Iran called the Darkhovin Site. On September 10, the regime's officials signed an extensive secret nuclear cooperation pact with China, only parts of which were revealed.
Tehran has also been seeking to hire foreign experts. At least fifty-four experts from foreign nations, including China, have been hired. The actual number of experts, however, is much greater. Dozens of Chinese and Russian experts also regularly travel to and from Iran. These experts are engaged in nuclear research, training Iranian specialists, supervising the construction of facilities, and setting up nuclear reactors.
In addition to the foreign nuclear experts mentioned above, the regime has managed to engage-at very high salaries-two Russian scholars, one expert from Kazakhstan, and one specialist from Turkmenistan to work in the training and research department of the Atomic Energy Organization in Tehran. These individuals are involved in research to speed up the "Great Plan." In addition, three specialists from Hungary are working in the GAMA Energy Center in Banab in north-eastern Iran.
To keep the nuclear program a secret, several parallel but independent and self-sufficient installations, including laboratories, workshops, and plants, are already under way in different parts of the country.
The Isfahan Project is currently the centerpiece of the "Great Plan" to gain nuclear weapons and has been given priority in Rafsanjani's five, year economic program, for two reasons. Its geographical location in central Iran makes Isfahan relatively secure from any foreign military attack of the kind that destroyed the nuclear site in the southern city of Bushehr during the Iran-Iraq War. Second, unlike the already cramped Amirabad installation in Tehran, the Isfahan plant has much greater potential for expansion.
The Isfahan Project will consist of a full-cycle program, focusing on nuclear technology research and production of nuclear weapons. The complex is located on a mountainside, forty kilometers from Isfahan. Some of the buildings are camouflaged, and others are constructed underground. A small nuclear reactor is presently in use there, but Tehran is working to obtain a larger one. A starter device known as a "neutron sparker" has been purchased from the Chinese. Experts at this facility, which is 40 percent complete, have received training in China.
The secret Karaj Project is similar to the one in Isfahan. It is a small city constructed under the cover of a medical and hospital complex. Chinese and Russian experts are involved in completing different phases of the project. The installation of the Chinese-supplied Calutron and the Cyclotron accelerator purchased from Belgium at the site is near completion, but the rest of the complex is only 35 percent completed.
One of the largest nuclear sites in Iran, the Gorgan Project is located northeast of Gorgan, on the shores of the Caspian Sea. It is supervised by Mansour Haj Azim, deputy director of the IAEO. Specialists from Russia and other former Soviet republics were hired to work on the project. They have completed preliminary earthquake studies to assess the feasibility of installing large reactors at the site.
Referred to as the "Karoun Plan," the Darkhovin Project is located at a Guards Corps garrison fifty kilometers northeast of Abadan, on the Ahwaz-Abadan Highway in southwest Iran. During the October 1991 meeting between Chinese President Yang Shang Kun and Rafsanjani, China agreed to provide technical and assessment assistance to complete the project, which was abandoned after the Iranian revolution in 1979. Chinese experts pay frequent visits to the Darkhovin complex.
Also known as the "Alamout Plan," the Mo'alem Kelayeh Project is located at an industrial complex in northern Qazvin, 120 kilometers northwest of Tehran. The Guards Corps relocated the local inhabitants to clear the area for construction of this site. To keep the project totally secret, Tehran did not seek the assistance of foreign experts and technicians in building the facility.
One of the most recently built nuclear sites is located in the vicinity of the city of Yazd in central Iran, close to a uranium mine in the nearby Sarghand desert.
The Yazd Project One of the most recently built nuclear sites is located in the vicinity of the city of Yazd in central Iran, close to a uranium mine in the nearby Sarghand desert. The Yazd complex has been established over the past three years. Its existence is a tightly kept secret, and the entire facility, taking up several thousand square meters, has been built underground. In summer 1992, a complete video report on the progress of the nuclear site was prepared for Khamenei. In November, Hashemi-Rafsanjani visited the site. Accompanied by Mansour Haj Azim, the deputy director of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, Rafsanjani was evaluating the progress of the center.34
Code-named the Qods (Jerusalem) Project, this complex was originally constructed by German firms during the reign of the shah. The site was heavily damaged during the eight-year Iran-Iraq War. The German refusal to resume work on the project after the war created a diplomatic crisis between Germany and the Khomeini regime. With help from China and Pakistan, the Guards Corps has rebuilt major parts of this multibillion-dollar facility. Rafsanjani paid a visit to the site in February 1993 to assess the progress of the project.35
Located near Bandar Abbas on the Strait of Hormuz, the Bandar Abbas Project is the site of Iran's ballistic missile production facilities. It is supervised by a special Guards Corps unit. The Revolutionary Guards Corps has taken over all the industrial installations dealing with medium- and long-range missile production.
For the past five years, the Iranians have been trying to modify the Silkworm short-range missile into a long-range missile. The tests were made possible with equipment bought from the German MBB Corporation.36 The Iranians have already produced a missile with a range of 400 kilometers and are working on a ballistic missile with the range of 1,500 kilometers. The Bandar Abbas Project also includes work on arming the ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. The navy commander, Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani, and his deputy, Rear Admiral Abbas Mohtaj, oversee this operation.
China, Pakistan, and Argentina are the main suppliers of equipment and material for Tehran's nuclear program. Tehran and Islamabad want to engage in joint ventures in the field of nuclear technology. During the visit by General Assif Nawaz, Pakistan's army commander in chief, to Iran in November 1991, an agreement was signed between the two countries, stipulating that both Pakistan and Iran will pursue their atomic programs with the assistance of the People's Republic of China. Iran is to allocate $5 billion for the joint atomic venture.37
Nuclear aid was also the "secret topic heading the agenda during the October visit to Tehran of the Chinese President," according to one Western report.38 Chinese experts have been sent to Iran, and Iranian technicians have been trained in China as part of the cooperation between the two countries on nuclear weapons.
Presently a shortage of enriched uranium prevents the mullahs from achieving the nuclear goals. A shareholder in the French-led Eurodif conglomerate, Iran has refused to forfeit her right of access to enriched uranium.39 With the Soviet Union's collapse, Iran saw a window of opportunity to realize its long-held nuclear dream. Several senior IAEO officials travelled to the former Soviet republics to persuade nuclear scientists to go to Tehran. Reza Amrollahi, the IAEO president, paid several visits to the Ukraine and Kazakhstan to explore the possibility of acquiring nuclear technology, nuclear warheads, and enriched uranium. Western experts viewed Velayati's visit in mid-December 1991 to Tadzhikistan-which has large uranium reserves and is the site of the former Soviet Union's uranium-enrichment plants-as an attempt to purchase enriched uranium. The cash-strapped Kazakhstan has been more inclined to cooperate.
Western experts viewed Velayati's visit in mid-December 1991 to Tadzhikistan- which has large uranium reserves and is the site of the former Soviet Union's uranium-enrichment plants- as an attempt to purchase enriched uranium. The cash-strapped Kazakhstan has been more inclined to cooperate.
According to intelligence reports from within the mullahs' regime, Tehran has purchased four nuclear warheads from the Central Asian republic of Kazakhstan. The first round of discussions about the sale were held when Kazakhstan's minister of transportation visited Tehran in April 1992. Subsequently, a group of Iranian officials, including several from the Ministry of Defense, travelled to Alma Ata in August. Revolutionary Guards Corps Brigadier General Vahid Dastjerdi, the commander of logistics for the Ministry of Defense, and Brigadier General Bake Muhammad-Doust, in charge of the ministry's industrial purchasing, were members of the delegation headed by the Defense Minister Ali Akbar Torkan. Tehran has paid in full for the four warheads, but they have not yet been delivered.
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A glance at the mullahs' weapons procurement program and their high military budget shows that Tehran's arms purchases far exceed its defense needs. The arms build up is motivated by Iran's enormous domestic political and economic crises. "They are in rather desperate shape, and the answer is to look outside aggressively," said one Western expert.40 The offensive nature of the arms build up, in light of the clerics' continuing efforts to export fundamentalism, is a source of grave concern for regional and global peace. Western analysts worry that "Iran is conspiring to build a strategic strike capability."41
Tehran's stockpiling of weapons has already changed the regional balance of power; the situation can only get worse if no international action is taken to ban arms sales to Iran. The mullahs' renewed assertive, ness in bilateral relations with their neighbours--including their intimidating treatment of the United Arab Emirates on the ownership of a Persian Gulf island-is an ominous sign that more trouble lies ahead. *
