Fundamentalism in the Arab World
The third millennium belongs to Islam and the rule of Muslims over the world.
-Ali-Muhammad Besharati, Deputy Foreign Minister,
March 3, 19921
Throughout the Arab world, from the arid, oil-rich deserts of Arabia to the Atlantic coast of North Africa, the forces of Islamic fundamentalism are on the rise. To what extent and in what ways are they dependent on the Iranian regime?
Of all Arab countries, Iraq has been the most important target for the clerical authorities in Iran. (See Chapter VI.) In addition, the mullahs' regime is exporting its revolution to three specific regions in the Arab world: the Eastern Mediterranean (the Levant), North Africa, and the Persian Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia.
The question of Palestine and the occupied territories has such political and psychological importance in the Islamic world that no government can claim to lead the Muslim masses without being a key player in the Arab, Israeli dispute.
Now that a new Middle East peace process has begun, the mullahs are determined to establish themselves as the staunchest opponents of any compromise. Tehran has invested heavily in the failure of the peace conference, hoping to raise the stature of its fundamentalist alternative in case the talks finally break down. (See Chapter XI(.
For these reasons, the Eastern Mediterranean region - Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Israel, and the occupied territories - is of critical importance to the clerical regime's regional strategy. Tehran has a very high stake in Lebanon, with its large Shi'ite population and the presence of a multitude of proxy groups armed and financed by the Iranian government. Syria, the mullahs' sole ally in the Arab world, adds to the importance of this area for Tehran, even though the Algerian experience demonstrates that if the conditions were to become ripe for fundamentalists to take power in Syria, the mullahs would certainly drop their support for Hafez Assad.
Jordan and the Occupied Territories
The developments in Lebanon during 1991 and 1992, most notably the strengthening of the central government's authority and the decline of paramilitary forces, have seriously hampered the activities of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards' contingent in Lebanon and Iran's indigenous operatives - the Hizbullah. The Iranian leaders, therefore, are searching for a suitable replacement for Lebanon.
Its common borders with the occupied territories and Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Syria, plus the presence of active Islamic fundamentalist elements and currents, make Jordan an ideal alternative.
Following the Persian Gulf War and before Tehran's resumption of diplomatic ties with Jordan in 1991, a high-ranking Iranian delegation visited the country. Its assessment, delivered to Iran's leadership in a confidential report, read in part:
After Lebanon, Jordan is an excellent theater of activity for us. Albeit a small country, its strategic location carries great significance. The press there is relatively free and the setting for activities is quite suitable. A group of young men came to see us privately. They said that in the course of the [Iran-Iraq] War, they supported our stance. We must pay special attention to them, for people who were attracted to our viewpoints during the era of repression in Jordan are quite valuable to our cause. We must offer them direction and guidance to lead them to power. The ambassador who goes to Jordan, therefore, must be very capable and intimately involved in the Lebanese experience, so that we avoid making the same mistakes here as we did in Lebanon.
The opening of the Iranian Embassy in Amman in 1991 gave the mullahs a base to implement this policy. The leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, which holds a third of the seats in the Jordanian Parliament were invited to Tehran to attend the Conference to Support Palestine's Islamic Revolution, held simultaneously with the Madrid Peace Conference in October 1991.
The Iranian clerics believe that King Hussein is allowing the Muslim Brotherhood to participate in parliament at a time when the central government is weak in an attempt to use the Brotherhood's credibility to legitimize Hussein's government. In the mullahs' view, the king's authority to dissolve the parliament and his other extra-parliamentary powers are hindering any serious action by the Jordanian fundamentalists. The Iranian delegation to Jordan concluded: "The reality is that client regimes like Jordan will never tolerate such forces in the long run."2
Iran's leaders exercise great caution and sophistication in establishing contacts and offering guidance to Jordanian groups, because they are aware that the government will not hesitate to clamp down on fundamentalists in Jordan. In Tehran, the Jordanian government's temporary ban on Al-Rabat magazine, which had ties with the Brotherhood, was seen as "a step in the direction of restricting the activities of Islamic groups in Jordan."3
Upon instructions from the clerical regime, fundamentalists in Jordan test the situation carefully before taking any action. For instance, they hold rallies in small groups, and if threatened they immediately disperse. They hold their gatherings or speeches at night because "they know full well that any violent action in Jordan will ultimately serve the interests of the ruling government."4 For example, 150 members of an underground group in Jordan went too far. They tried to kidnap one of King Hussein's sons on his way to school and were arrested. These individuals were previously active under the names of "Muhammad's Army" or "mujahideen in the path of God" and had received the necessary training in Afghanistan.5
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps established its military presence in Lebanon in 1982, and the large local Shi'ite community provided the mullahs with a formidable background within which to operate. The presence of other Arab nationals in Lebanon also enabled Iran to strengthen its network by recruiting them. (See Chapter X(
Iran continued to be directly involved in Lebanon after Khomeini's death in 1989. During his trip to Syria in April 1991, Rafsanjani personally intervened to prevent the mullahs' proxy groups from being disarmed. These groups operate in the Bekaa valley, near the Syrian border, and in South Lebanon, close to the areas under Israeli control. In previous years Rafsanjani had persistently aided and protected Iran's terrorist operatives in Lebanon. On February 1, 1992, Muhammad Hussein Fadhlullah, a senior Hizbullah cleric, met with Rafsanjani and "gave him a report on the situation and issues relating to Muslims in Lebanon."6
Following the death of Hizbullah leader Abbas Moussavi in a helicopter attack in South Lebanon on February 16, 1992, the new leader, Seyyed Hassan Nasrullah, went to Tehran and met with Rafsanjani, Khamenei, and other officials of the regime to receive guidelines for his future course of action. Upon Nasrullah's return to Lebanon, an Israeli diplomat was assassinated in Turkey on March 7, and the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires was bombed on March 17. A U.S. official told Reuters news agency that his government's investigations showed that Tehran was directly behind the attack.
According to reports by Western and Middle Eastern intelligence sources, "the political training camps of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, led by Ahmed Jibril, are being transferred to Iran. The camps are believed to be in the area of Khorramabad and Kermanshah in southern and western Iran."7
The clerical regime has provided numerous facilities for terrorist groups in Lebanon. According to one report, "Imad Mugniyeh has been involved in many violent incidents against French and American forces in Lebanon. The hijacking of at least four planes and several bombings and killings are attributed to him. He has an Iranian diplomatic passport which facilitates his trips"8
Finally, the Revolutionary Guards continue their military presence in Lebanon. More than 1,500 Revolutionary Guards from the Guards' First Corps have been organized into "the Lebanon Corps" They have brought under their control areas of Lebanon, including the Bekaa Valley and Baalbek. Syria allows them to operate as part of its strategic cooperation with Iran.9
For Tehran's rulers the export of fundamentalism to Iraq and the Persian Gulf states and especially Saudi Arabia has always had strategic priority in the Arab world. But for three main reasons the Arab countries of North Africa, including Algeria, Tunisia, and Sudan, have been given tactical priority: First, the domestic situation in the North African countries has made them much more vulnerable to the onslaught of Islamic fundamentalism. Second, the greater readiness and presence of the United States and its Western Allies in the Persian Gulf has sharply increased the risks for the mullahs in that region. Third, the Persian Gulf Arab states would be almost encircled by hostile states if North Africa fell into the hands of fundamentalist forces.
The mullahs believe that the scene is therefore set for a second phase of Islamic expansionism, this time in the Islamic hinterlands: the Arabian Peninsula, Mesopotamia, the Fertile Crescent, and Egypt. Unlike the wave of Islamisation that began in the seventh century, the current tide of what the mullahs call "reconversion" is moving in from the opposite direction: from the periphery to the center. 10
The fundamentalists' rise to power in Sudan, their ascent in Algeria, and their serious threat to Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco demonstrate that the mullahs may be proved right.
As a result of close, long-term relations with Algeria, the mullahs succeeded in establishing extensive ties with that nation's indigenous fundamentalist groups and were able to infiltrate their ranks. The mullahs also counted on Algeria to serve as a springboard for the export of fundamentalism to its neighboring countries in North Africa, as well as to France, where millions of Muslims (mostly of North African extraction) reside. Iranian leaders were convinced that the fundamentalists' victory in Algeria would lead to the collapse of the Maghreb countries, as "Tunisia and Morocco cannot prevent this development through repressive measures."11
The regime's plans for export of revolution to Algeria can clearly be seen in the minutes of a confidential coordinating meeting among the representatives of Rafsanjani's office, Khamenei's office, the Foreign Ministry, and the Intelligence Ministry in July 1991. Parts of the conclusions are as follows:
The principle raised by the leadership that Islam must continue to move forward in Algeria must remain on top of the agenda. Given the proximity of Algeria to Tunisia and Egypt, the impact of the Islamic movement goes beyond Algeria. Thus the pressure we are facing now in the Middle East region will ease if serious developments come about in North Africa. In addition to previous coordination with other North African countries, closer ties are necessary.
Later in the meeting, the status of Tehran's contacts in Algeria and those Algerians who had traveled to Iran were appraised as follows:
a. Contacts with the rest of those who had been briefed but not arrested must be maintained.
b. Previously established contacts should not arouse the sensitivity of the Algerian government. Caution must therefore be exercised.
c. Material assistance will from now on take on indirect form. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs will determine the third parties and contacts. The plan will be advanced by the Ministry through the Iranian Embassy in Algeria.
Ali Khamenei, the regime's spiritual leader, stressed in a meeting with the minister of education and a group of ministry officials, "We believe that the people of Algeria will finally attain their desired Islam and the rule of Islam."12
Tehran promised the fundamentalists that if a theocratic regime came to power in Algeria, Iran would provide Algiers with a $5 billion assistance package. Along with such economic incentives, the mullahs spared no efforts to incite the fundamentalist forces in Algeria. In a controversial speech, Khamenei emphasized, "The people of Algeria who chant 'Allah-o-Akbar' ['God is Great'] from the rooftops have learned to do so from the Muslim and revolutionary people of Iran, because this nation has specifically taught Muslims throughout the world the path to struggle against the Arrogant West and the camp belonging to the enemies of humanity."13 For their part, the Algerian fundamentalists reiterated that their prime objective was to establish an Islamic government in Algeria, modeled after "the Islamic Republic of Iran."14
Prior to the escalation of the crisis in Algeria, which led to the cancellation of elections in May 1991, the mullahs had taken some initial steps to export their revolution to that country. An internal document reveals that Tehran had dispatched in February 1990 some 100 Revolutionary Guards and Arabic-speaking students to Algeria. During local elections in Algeria, it "provided $3 million in campaign aid" to the fundamentalist forces, 15 who boasted of having an armed wing with direct connections to the Iranian religious center of Qom.16
The mullahs' activities in Tunisia were first exposed in 1987, when a group of local fundamentalists was arrested. These arrests followed the detention of an Iranian Embassy employee at the French-Swiss border. The employee carried documents revealing Iran's contacts with Tunisian fundamentalists and its other involvement in that country.
Subsequently, Iran's charge d'affaires in Tunisia, Ahmad Kan'ani, was declared persona non grata. In July 1987, a Tunisian named Lutfi, a former fundamentalist recruited and trained by the Iranians to join their network in Tunisia, was the target of an assassination attempt by the mullahs' terrorists after he provided the French police with detailed information on Tehran's activities and contacts in Tunisia. In a private meeting, Seyyed Hadi Khosrow-Shahi, the regime's ambassador to the Vatican, who was responsible for providing the necessary facilities for the regime's terrorists abroad and whose role has been extensively exposed by the media in Italy and Britain, expressed great dismay over the Tunisian developments: "In Tunisia they have arrested our good contacts on the charge of cooperating with Iran."
On March 23, 1992, an armed group calling itself the "Islamic Jihad" was uncovered by Tunisian security forces. The group's activities were overseen by one of the leaders of the An-Nahdha movement, which has very close links to Iran. One of the group's activists confessed during interrogations that he had received weapons training in Iran.17
Rachid Al-Ghannouchi, the leader of the An-Nahdha has regularly visited Tehran and carries a Sudanese passport given to him by Sudan at Iran's behest.18 In a meeting on March 28, 1991, with Tehran University students visiting Algiers, he stressed, "Iranian youths' efforts inspired university students in Tunisia to resist Habib Bourguiba's rule. Our movement was in dire need of Islamic revolutionary ideals which marked a turning point in our movement."19
On September 1, 1991, a Tunisian magazine reported that "80 members of a secret Islamic movement were arrested in connection with Iran while trying to engage in subversive activities."20 It has also been reported that in 1991, Tunisian security forces arrested 300 fundamentalists charged with plotting a coup.21
On January 15, 1992, an Iranian parliamentary delegation, headed by Ahmad Azizi, met the speaker of the Tunisian parliament in Tunis. The Tunisians reportedly criticized the Iranians sharply for their support for fundamentalists in the Maghreb region. The Tunisians were especially critical of Iran for supporting the An-Nahdha and its leader, Rachid Al-Ghannouchi, who had visited Iran upon official invitation of the mullahs. The Tunisian parliament's speaker told the visiting delegation: "As much as we are seeking to establish ties with Iran, we also demand Iran's noninterference in Tunisia's internal affairs."22
In light of the growing influence of Iranian-inspired fundamentalists in North Africa, Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia signed a security pact in January 1992 in an attempt to adopt a uniform approach in their confrontation with fundamentalism.23 The agreement came as Tunisia put its police and gendarmerie forces on full alert upon a directive issued by the Interior Minister.24
Sudan's geopolitical position makes it an ideal base for export of fundamentalism to Africa.25 As one of the continent's largest countries, it straddles the Arab north and the sub-Saharan heartland of Africa. Its long border with Egypt and its control of the western coastline of the Red Sea (putting it close to Saudi Arabia) give Sudan considerable leverage in the region. The Nile also gives Sudan great agricultural potential and its control of the river's flow is of vital concern to Egypt, which regards the Nile as its lifeline.
After the military assumed power in Sudan in June 1989, Tehran sharply increased its activities in that country. Many Sudanese students belonging to the National Islamic Front have gone to Iran, some to study in Qom, Mashad, and Tehran. In an interview, a Sudanese religious leader very close to the Iranian regime stated: "In the case of Iran, Islam emerged through a revolution, through military institution in the case of Sudan, and through the ballot box in Algeria."26
In December 1991, Rafsanjani paid an official visit to Sudan in the company of Intelligence Minister Ali Fallahian, Guards Corps Commander in Chief Mohsen Rezaii, and Defense Minister Ali Akbar Torkan, as well as more than 150 others. In a speech in Khartoum, Rafsanjani told his hosts: "Sudan can play a more important role in the new world order." During the trip, $17 million worth of financial assistance was given to Sudan. Iran also agreed to pay China $300 million for weapons it ordered for Sudan. In addition, Iran agreed to deliver one million tons of free oil to Sudan annually.
Following Rafsanjani's departure from Khartoum, two ships carrying oil, light weapons, and artillery shells sailed toward Sudanese ports. Soon thereafter, Sudan's military ruler, General Omar Al-Bashir, announced that Islamic laws would be put into effect in Sudan. The first order of business: Women would have to wear the veil in public places.
At about the same time, Western intelligence sources reported the dispatch to Sudan of a contingent of one to two thousand Iranian Revolutionary Guards. The Supreme Command of the Sudanese Armed Forces stated that in meetings between Sudan's military commanders and Iranian Defense Minister Torkan "the two sides reviewed developments in military relations and cooperation and exchange of experts."27 Subsequently reports on Sudan's attempts to establish a military unit similar to Iran's Revolutionary Guards Corps came to light.28 The Sudanese leadership's foreign affairs counselor visited Tehran to get guidance on setting up such a force.29 On March 31, 1992, the formation of the Popular Defense Forces (PDF) of Sudan was made public. As a Western journalist wrote: "Their khaki outfits made in Iran introduces these young troops who are ready to fight a Jihad, or holy war. The PDF forces trained to march with a gun and recite the Quran are part of Sudan's new Islamic forces. They are modeled after Iran's Revolutionary Guards and reported by some Western observers to be trained by Iranians."30
Reacting to these developments, the U.S. State Department announced, "It is obvious that very close political ties are developing between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Sudan's National Islamic Front which includes Iran's support for Sudan's paramilitary Popular Defense Forces."31 Some American analysts expressed the view that "Sudan, which is being supported by Iranian money and know-how, will be another Lebanon very soon, becoming a base for the export of terrorism."32 Because, as one expert put it, "Iran has tried in the past to export revolution, but Sudan is the first place where they have had a regime that is a willing supporter."33
Clear signs confirm this assessment: The mullahs have spent $20 million to build a main center in Khartoum and dispatched teams of Revolutionary Guards to Sudan for protection and security. The mullahs' top agent in Sudan, Majid Kamal, held the same post in Beirut during the 1980s and was active in the formation of the Hizbullah.34 The Guards Corps contingent in Sudan was reported in May 1992 to be commanded by Husseinzadeh, a colonel in the Revolutionary Guards Corps.35
Iran is also trying to pursue a highly aggressive strategy in Sudan which encompasses not only Egypt but the south and central African Sahara as well. "Other indications, such as the presence of the leaders of some terrorist groups, aggravate the situation in Sudan,"36 noted an American official.
A short while after Rafsanjani's return from Sudan, Egypt accused Sudan of training Islamic fundamentalists active in Egypt and charged that Sudan was the source of a vast illegal arms traffic to that country. Reuters reported that "during two hours of talks in Cairo with Major General Al-Zubair Muhammad Saleh, Sudan's number two, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak urged Sudan to distance itself from Muslim fundamentalist groups and explain its close links with Iran."37 Mean, while, Egyptian security forces reported "the arrest of a group of Muslim fundamentalists who were trained by Iranian groups based in Sudan."38 The Egyptian press has contended that the man who in October 1990 assassinated Rifaat Mahgoub, the speaker of the Egyptian parliament, was trained in Khartoum. 39
Following reports that the Sudanese Embassy in the United Arab Emirates had become a center for suspicious political activities, UAE officials expelled seven Sudanese diplomats, including Sudan's ambassador.40 Tunisia also recalled its ambassador from Khartoum because Rachid Al-Ghonnouchi, leader of the An-Nahdha group, was given extensive facilities by the Sudanese, including a diplomatic passport. According to Egyptian and Tunisian intelligence sources, "Since May, Muslim extremists have been receiving training in about ten camps set up in Sudan with Iranians' cooperation. The camps are being used to train Islamic fundamentalists from Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, and the Gulf states for subversion."41
As one Middle East analyst put it: "If Khomeini were alive, he would have been proud of his successors who succeeded in exporting fundamentalist Islamic revolution to the Horn of Africa. The Islamic Republic's activities began from Sudan and have now reached the Muslim communities in Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Djibouti."42 Diplomatic visitors have reported a noticeable increase in Iranian activity in Mogadishu, the Somali capita1.43
Among the North African states, Egypt is considered the biggest prize for the mullahs. It is the most populous country in the region, and the Islamic fundamentalist movement has a long history there. One of the most important objectives of the Iranian regime's involvement in Sudan is to lay the groundwork for expanding its network among Egyptian fundamentalists. As an official from Rafsanjani's office said, "If developments in Algeria accelerate, the region will inevitably witness some movements in Tunisia, Egypt, and Sudan. We have forces in Egypt but do not want to lose them too quickly."44
In early 1992, the Iranian regime sent a skilled analyst by the name of Arefinia to Egypt in the company of its charge d'affaires, Ali-Asghar Muhammadi. He drew up a report concluding that Egypt was a fertile ground from which to recruit Islamic fundamentalist groups. He further stated that such groups could be quite effective militarily and would have to be assisted. Based on another top-secret document, Muhammadi, who had previously been commissioned to Lebanon, followed up these groups' activities in Egypt and began working with them.
Responding to Tehran's increasing support for fundamentalist forces, Cairo's Interior Minister Muhammad Abdel-Halim Moussa accused Rafsanjani's government of "exporting religious terrorism" to Egypt. He said Tehran was directly involved in acts of terror on Egyptian soil. 45
The mullahs' actions to "export revolution" to Egypt and their support for fundamentalists there resulted in the closure of Iran's Interest Section in Cairo. Foreign Minister Velayati acknowledged that the Egyptian government's move was prompted by Iran's "contacts with Muslim groups in that country."46 This coincided with Tehran's efforts to open an embassy in Cairo to "assist the people of Egypt."47 Despite the diplomatic break, the mullahs have continued their efforts to bring about an "Islamic Revolution" in the Arab world's largest nation. Majlis deputy Abolqassem Sarhadizadeh said, "Currently the primary path to the salvation of Palestine passes through liberating Egypt from the clutches of reactionary [states] and the Arrogant [West]. The people of Egypt must repeat their past revolution and not allow the Arrogant West and reactionary forces to control their destiny."48
In February 1992, a group of thirty-five fundamentalists were arrested in Egypt. Ten of them belonged to the Jihad group supported by Tehran. Most of the thirty-five either carried weapons or were arrested while distributing leaflets.49 After the arrest, Cairo announced that it had uncovered a plot against the government, reportedly backed by Iranian or Sudanese fundamentalists.50 The government then arrested twenty-eight suspected Islamic activists, saying they were "part of an international network planning to overthrow the government." Egyptian security sources said the twenty-eight were arrested following the arrest of three men at a Cairo computer firm51 that was a front for establishing ties with the regime in Iran.52 At about the same time, Egyptian police arrested ninety fundamentalists from the Islamic Jihad in the wake of the murder of a police officer in the Al-Fayum region. Reacting to these developments, a senior Egyptian official said, "Egypt is monitoring with concern Iran's extensive activities on the African continent, particularly in the Nile region. Iran has signed agreements with African countries on the basis of which in exchange for opening embassies, consulates, and cultural centers, Iran will sell them oil with reduced prices."53
Morocco's geographic proximity to Europe, its close ties with the West, and the existence of powerful fundamentalist currents make this country a priority on the mullahs' target list. In 1991 and '92, Morocco witnessed bloody confrontations between fundamentalist students and secular groups in the country's universities. Fundamentalist groups trained in Algeria and Sudan played an important role in these clashes. Tehran had high hopes that its embassy in Rabat, opened in spring 1991, gave the Iranian regime a greater opportunity to reach out to the fundamentalists and establish contacts with them, in the same way that links with the fundamentalists in Algeria were made and expanded.
On several occasions, the Moroccan government has warned against fundamentalist threats. During the Casablanca Summit in autumn 1991, the leaders of Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, Libya, and Mauritania discussed "joint security measures to confront the fundamentalists."54
Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf States
When 200 armed men forcibly occupied the Great Mosque in Mecca, Islam's holiest spot, at the dawn prayers in November 1979, the world was shocked to see the fundamentalist challenge reach Saudi Arabia. Khomeini supported the fundamentalist raiders, and thus began a long, turbulent relationship between Tehran and Riyadh.
Saudi Arabia's immense wealth and its custody of Islam's holiest shrines made it an ideal target for the mullahs. They have even attacked Saudi Arabia's legitimacy, insisting the country change its name to Najd and Hijaz, and calling for the transfer of Mecca and Medina to international control.
Tehran's moves against Saudi Arabia have included smuggling large amounts of explosives and weapons into the country during the hajj pilgrimage. These activities reached their peak during the hajj riots in the holy city of Mecca in 1987. Rafsanjani later said of that incident:
The martyrs' blood must be avenged by burning the roots of Saudi rulers in the region. The revenge for [the spilling of Iranians'] sacred blood [in Mecca rioting] will be to divest the control of the holy shrines and holy mosques from the contaminated existence of the Wahhabis, these hooligans, these malignant people. The true revenge is to remove the colossal and precious wealth belonging to the Islamic world which lies under the soil of the Arabian Peninsula from the control of criminals, the agents of colonialism. The Saudi rulers have chosen an evil path, and we will send them to hell.55
Tehran is also trying to increase its leverage on Saudi Arabia by increasing its influence in North Africa, especially in Sudan. At the same time, the mullahs are feverishly competing with Saudi Arabia for ideological and political influence in Afghanistan and in the Central Asian republics.
Changes in the political landscape of the Persian Gulf region during and after the Persian Gulf crisis and war have compelled Tehran to tone down its official propaganda against Saudi Arabia, but the mullahs continue to foment trouble among the Shi'ite population of the Saudis' Eastern Province and support the fundamentalist surge in the country that has emerged since the Persian Gulf War. Through a number of proxy organizations based in Qom, the Khomeini regime is training Saudi nationals and returning them to the country. The state-run press occasionally carries the statements or declarations issued by such groups.
In Saudi Arabia itself, the fundamentalist challenge to the authorities has never been so vociferous. In a preemptive measure in January 1992, security forces arrested a large number of preachers and mosque prayer leaders who had accused the government in their sermons of violating the principles and laws of Islam and adopting pro-Western policies. Iranian officials and media strongly condemned these arrests. U.S. officials have expressed concern about the increased circulation of fundamentalist, antigovernment material in Saudi Arabia.56 In addition, according to Western diplomats, the Saudis were particularly concerned about the increasing Iranian involvement in Saudi Arabia's southern neighbor, Yemen.57
When the Saudi government recognized Algeria's new government, a proxy group based in Tehran issued a statement denouncing the Saudi move: "Efforts by the rulers of Hijaz [Saudi Arabia] reflect this mercenary client regime's anti-Islamic objectives. Its only impact is to enlighten the Muslims throughout the world of the nature of such regimes."58
The mullahs' priority target areas for export of religious fundamentalism are by no means limited to Central Asia, the Arabian Peninsula, and North Africa. African countries such as Nigeria, Tanzania, Senegal, and Mauritania, and Asian countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and the Indian subcontinent provide fertile ground for the growth of fundamentalist Islam. The mullahs regularly invite delegations of clergymen and preachers from these countries to Tehran to attend political and ideological conferences and ceremonies. In one such ceremony celebrating the 1992 anniversary of the "Islamic Revolution" in Iran, a Nigerian guest, Ibrahim Zakzaki, declared that "the emergence of Islam in Iran is a great triumph for the world's Muslims." Muhammad Kamal Adam, an Ethiopian, said, "Muslims must come to their senses and regain their Islamic thinking. To withstand the Arrogant West's assault and conspiracies, we must implement Islamic decrees and unite the Muslims." Sheikh Ahmad Tijansila, the prayer leader of Freetown, Sierra Leone's capital, stated, "The awakened Muslims will attain their righteous desire of assuming the reins of power." Abu-Bakr Ghailuli, head of the Congo's Islamic Group, said: "Whenever the people of the Congo want to speak about Godly and victorious uprisings, they refer to Iran's Islamic revolution as an example."
To advance their political designs in these countries, from Southern Africa to the Sahara and from the Horn of Africa to the western regions of the continent, Iran's clerics are trying to exploit any act of protest, most of which are the product of worsening economic conditions.
By the same token, Tehran intends to take advantage of the unrest and prevailing conflict in Kashmir. Addressing Western countries, Rafsanjani said, "Whereas you boast of human rights everywhere, why do you brand as terrorist the people of Kashmir who are being so brutally victimized?"59 In a trip to Muzaffarabad in the Pakistani-controlled Kashmir, Mohsen Rezaii, the Guards Corps commander in chief, announced, "Iranians are prepared to go into battle alongside their brothers in Kashmir."60
Ali-Akbar Velayati, the foreign minister, said that India must allow the people of Kashmir to decide on their own future, and Iran cannot remain indifferent to the destiny of that region's Muslims. Khamenei, the regime's leader, stressed that Islamic nations must be aware that Kashmiri Muslims expect to be defended. "If the government of India believes that it can forever keep such large numbers of Muslims under pressure without any reaction by the Muslims in the world, it is undoubtedly mistaken," he said.61 *
