An "International Islamic Army"
The existence of such an [international Islamic] army rules out the superpowers' interference in disputes among Muslim countries.
-Guards Corps Major General Mohsen Rezaii,
Commander in Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps,
August 6,19911
In the first few years of Khomeini's rule, while the doctrine of "export of revolution" was still in its infancy, the implementation of this policy went through different stages, gradually becoming more focused and sophisticated. Eventually, superior resources and the most veteran military commanders were assigned to carry out the policy.
The Revolutionary Guards Corps (also known as the Pasdaran [Guardians] of Islamic Revolution) was set up as a paramilitary force in the early months after the overthrow of the shah in 1979. Formed on Khomeini's order and made up largely of zealous supporters of the new theocratic state, the Guards Corps' original mandate was to maintain internal security. From the outset, it unleashed a brutal crackdown on democratic opposition forces, often attacking the rallies and ransacking the offices of political parties whose views were not necessarily in line with those of Khomeini. After the Guard Corps turned a peaceful demonstration of half a million Tehran residents into a bloodbath on June 20, 1981, the Guards Corps arrested tens of thousands of people. In the next few years, they executed 100,000 dissidents. Members of the Guards Corps became notorious for viciously torturing political detainees.
The Guards Corps also played a major role in the eight-year Iran-Iraq War, often using human-wave attacks that took the lives of one million Iranians. The overwhelming majority were youngsters forcibly dispatched to the war fronts. In addition, the Revolutionary Guards Corps comprised the backbone of the Iranian regime's extraterritorial activities, planning and executing hundreds of terrorist attacks, bombings, hijackings, kidnappings, and assassinations of Iranian and foreign nationals. In a speech in late 1992 Rafsanjani stressed the role of the Guards Corps in helping the regime to stay in power: "The continuous readiness of these [Guards] forces at all times, their discipline, order, and wide, spread presence to defend the revolution are vital. In its organization, this force must always enjoy sufficient reserve and manpower."2
In 1979 the first organ within the Guards Corps responsible for directing terrorist operations and export of fundamentalism abroad was formed, the Liberation Movements Unit. It rapidly began to recruit and train fanatics attracted to Khomeini's ideology in different Muslim countries. The Liberation Movements Unit's primary objective was to establish client Islamic republics in Iraq and Persian Gulf states.
The regime, however, failed in its efforts to overthrow these governments, assassinate their rulers, or carry out "Islamic coups." Some of these countries arrested or expelled Tehran's agents provocateurs. Bahrain, for instance, expelled a Shi'ite cleric called Modaressi, while Kuwait forced mullah Mehri to leave the country and go to Iran. Both men were Khomeini's representatives and were incriminated in assassination and coup plots.
Mir-Hussein Moussavi, the mullahs' prime minister in the 1980s, elaborated on Iran's strategy in a 1985 interview: "Immediately after the revolution, we had our own vision of 'exporting revolution,' believing that the Islamic revolution would spread in the region within one year in a chain reaction. It seems, however, that we were mistaken in our initial assessment, which predicted a rapid spread of the revolution."3
As the acting commander in chief of the armed forces during the Iran-Iraq War, Rafsanjani reorganized the units and organizations involved in the export of revolution in two ways. First, he merged the Guards Corps Liberation Movements Unit with other groups that had sprung up, eliminating parallel organizations in a bid to streamline the export-of-Islam effort. Second, he strengthened the main units involved in the export of revolution to boost the efficiency and reduce the political independence of their activities.
Henceforth, the role of the Guards Corps' Intelligence Directorate increased and several new units were formed, including the Lebanon Corps, the Ramadhan Headquarters (in charge of Iraqi affairs), and the Ansar Headquarters (in charge of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Indian affairs.) Simultaneously, the regime drastically reduced the role of such organizations as the Martyrs Foundation and the Islamic Propaganda Organization, which had previously enjoyed some degree of autonomy in the export of revolution. The organizations' overseas operations were placed under the Guards Corps' supervision. Since the reorganization, the Guards Corps and three ministries-Foreign Affairs, Islamic Culture and Guidance, and Intelligence-have played key roles in the export of revolution.
Senior Iranian officials have repeatedly stressed in their public statements that "the Islamic Republic's diplomats must be devout Hizbullahis," that is, they must be dedicated to the spread of Islamic fundamentalism.4 This requirement gives an important role to the Foreign Ministry and its diplomats in the export of revolution. A glance at the list of Tehran's Foreign Ministry officials and ambassadors and their past records reveals that this ministry is in fact a political, terrorist organ, and conventional diplomatic activities constitute only a part of its undertakings.
Hussein Sheikh ol-Islam, the deputy foreign minister for Arab and African Affairs; Muhammad-Hussein Mala' ek, the former ambassador to Switzerland; and Mehdi Ahari-Mostafavi, one of the ministry's director generals and the former ambassador to Germany, were among the leaders of the Students Following the Imam's Line. Closely linked to the Guards Corps, they played an active role in the 444-day seizure of the U.S. Embassy compound in Tehran. Hadi Najafabadi and Sirous Nasseri, the regime's ambassadors to Saudi Arabia and the European Headquarters of the United Nations, have had strong ties to the Guards Corps for many years. They were directly involved in the April 1990 assassination in Geneva of Kazem Rajavi, a leading critic of Tehran's human rights violations and the representative of the National Council of Resistance of Iran in Switzerland.
Manouchehr Mottaki, deputy foreign minister for international affairs, was a member of the Guards Corps before joining the diplomatic service. During his tenure as the regime's ambassador in Ankara, Mottaki was involved in at least two assassination attempts against the Mojahedin. Following protests by Turkish authorities, he was recalled to Tehran. Kamal Kharrazi, the mullahs' permanent representative at the United Nations headquarters in New York, was one of the founders of the Guards Corps in 1979. For years, he was among the top decision makers pushing the regime's aggressive policies. Muhammad-Reza Baqeri, who replaced Mottaki as the ambassador to Turkey, was a member of the Guards Corps Intelligence Unit. Muhammad-Mehdi Akhundzadeh-Basti, Tehran's former charge d'affaires in London and the director general of international organizations at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was also previously active in the Guards Corps contingent in Gilan Province.
The tasks of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have been defined by Iranian authorities as follows:
Noting in particular the far-reaching and enormous objectives of the Islamic Republic with regards to the export of revolution and the liberation movements, social groups and even ordinary citizens, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs must adopt guidelines needed to coordinate the activities of different organs involved in the field of foreign policy.5
All political, propaganda, and subversive activities in any given country are carried out with the prior knowledge of the regime's embassy in that country and with the approval of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Exceptions to this rule need the approval of the Supreme National Security Council.
In Islamic countries, the regime's embassies have the additional task of establishing ties with indigenous fundamentalist Islamic forces. They provide these forces with pro-Iranian propaganda and gradually sustain them with financial support. After initial recruitment, these forces are sent to Iran for military training. Over the years, the mullahs' embassies have thoroughly implemented such a policy in Algeria, Sudan, Tunisia, Turkey, and above all, Lebanon. In 1988, Tunisia announced that it was severing ties with the Tehran regime because of the Iranian embassy's efforts to contact Tunisian fundamentalists and provide them with ideological indoctrination, training, and financial support.
Appraising Iran's activities abroad, the Supreme National Security Council concluded in the post-Persian Gulf War period that the policy of export of revolution was far less successful in countries where Iran had no embassy. A diplomatic delegation that had visited Jordan a few months prior to the opening of the regime's embassy in Amman concluded in a classified report: "There is much sympathy for our revolution in this country; we should open an embassy there and become active as soon as possible. We must compensate for the ten-year delay."6
The Foreign Ministry's Third and Fourth Political Bureaus attached to the Directorate for Arab and African Affairs are especially active in export of revolution. These bureaus are run by mullah Muhammad-Kazem Khansari, who has a long record in terrorist activities. Several key people work under Khansari's supervision:
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Mahmoud Hashemi, Rafsanjani's younger brother and the head of the Third Political Bureau. He is also in charge of issues related to the Muslim Brotherhood.
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Muhammad-Mehdi Pour-Muhammadi, head of the Fourth Political Bureau and in charge of the Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Libya, and Sudan desk. Muhammadi had spent time in Lebanon and was counselor at the Iranian Embassy in Syria in 1990.
In autumn 1991, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs established independent bureaus for the Central Asian republics, increasing its activities to facilitate the export of the Islamic revolution to those republics.
Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance
All official Iranian cultural centers abroad are affiliated with the Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance. In the mullahs' lexicon, cultural activity means laying the groundwork and recruiting agents for the export of Khomeiniism.
Muhammad Khatami, the minister of Islamic culture and guidance, was a major policy maker and a staunch advocate of the policy of "expansion of the Islamic Revolution" before being ousted for being "too liberal." Through Muhammad-Ali Taskhiri, a senior official at Khamenei's office, Khatami informed the regime's leader of the extraterritorial activities of the Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance. These activities are carried out under the supervision of the Ministry's International Directorate, headed by mullah Muhammad-Ali Abtahi. Sa'idi is the official in charge of the Arab Affairs Directorate.
The ministry's main task is to create places such as cultural centers or libraries where it will be easy for Tehran's agents to contact local sympathizers. Once contacted, recruited, and given basic indoctrination, local fundamentalists are sent to Iran or Lebanon for more training.
Pakistan offers a good example of the activities of Iran's cultural centers abroad. In December 1990, Sadeq Ganji, head of the Iran, Pakistan Cultural Center, was killed in a clash with Pakistanis. Investigators said the killing was motivated by acts of sedition conducted by Ganji under the guise of cultural activities. Another member of the Cultural Center, who had been also shot, said: "Sadeq Ganji had turned the Cultural Center into a place for propagating revolutionary and Islamic culture.... He had greatly intimidated the Wahhabis, who are dependent on the Saudis and the Arrogant West. He was in close contact with all activist Shi'ite Islamic groups and had recently increased his links with their leaders."7
Since its establishment some ten years ago, Vezarat-e-Ettela'at (the Ministry of Intelligence) has rapidly grown into one of the largest government institutions. Rafsanjani systematically oversees the ministry's operations through Ali Fallahian, the intelligence minister. A large number of the regime's assassination squads are affiliated with this ministry. The Intelligence Ministry also dispatches its special intelligence teams to various countries to reconnoiter the activities of the opposition, especially the Mojahedin, for the mullahs. In its routine contacts, the ministry offers intelligence assistance to help the Guards Corps carry out its special operations.
The intelligence minister, Fallahian, openly boasted of murdering the regime's opponents abroad in a press conference in August: "We track them [opposition groups] outside the country, too. We have them under surveillance. . . . We have succeeded in dealing blows to many of these grouplets outside the country and at the borders. . . . Last year, we succeeded in striking fundamental blows to their top members."8
The Guards Corps' Special Qods (Jerusalem) Force is the most secret of the Iranian regime's numerous military organizations. Since its inception in 1990, the clerics have kept it under such secrecy that even many top officials in Tehran know nothing about the "Qods Force" except the name of its commander, Ahmad Vahidi. The new force, referred to as the "seed of the International Islamic Army" by its commanders, has now turned into the Guards Corps' most active, skilled, and elite unit. It includes the Corps' most experienced commanding officers and personnel. Its task is defined as "commanding, planning, and executing extra, territorial operations of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps."9 Its commander directly reports to the regime's leader, Khamenei. The Qods Force directly supervises or at least coordinates all terrorist operations or activities related to the "export of the Islamic Revolution" to various countries. The Qods Force was established following a detailed appraisal by Iranian leaders of their extensive terrorist activities in the 1980s.
Prior to the formation of the Qods Force, the Guards Corps consisted of the army, the navy, the air force, and the Bassij (paramilitary urban security unit). Formed as an independent body, the Qods Force was placed under the command of the Guards Corps Central Headquarters. The Qods force commander, Vahidi, is a Guards Corps brigadier general and was formerly the commander of the Intelligence Directorate (a key department at the Guards Corps Central Headquarters). Once the Qods Force was formed, the Ramadhan and Ansar headquarters and the Lebanon Corps were placed under Vahidi's command. Despite numerous changes in the Guards Corps in recent years, Vahidi's position has remained unchanged. (See Appendix.(
Final coordination of the Qods Force's activities in a given country and provision of the appropriate diplomatic or other cover for its agents, the use of diplomatic facilities and immunities to get supplies and messages, and provision of arms and military equipment for terrorists fall within the responsibilities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its embassies. The regime's embassies also gather detailed information on the activities of opposition groups and personalities. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs passes on the information to the Qods Force.
The most experienced Guards Corps commanders, particularly those active in extraterritorial operations, have been gathered in the General Staff of the Qods Force. In fact, there are no essential differences between members of the Qods Force Staff and the G.C. General Staff. The commanders of Intelligence, Operations, and Training directorates, for instance, are among the Qods Force's key commanders. Commander of the Qods Operations Directorate is G.C. Brigadier General Hussein Moslehi, the ex-commander of the Lebanon Corps. It was under his command that the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut was blown up in 1983. Upon returning from Lebanon, Moslehi assumed command of the 1st Sarollah Corps, the G.C.'s most experienced and largest force in the Iran, Iraq War. The 1st Corps was made up of the Muhammad Rasulullah, Seyyed osh-Shohada, and Ali ibn Abi Talib divisions, which spearheaded the Khomeini regime's offensives in the Iran-Iraq War.
The commander of the Qods Force's Intelligence Directorate, Guards Corps Brigadier General Muhammad-Ja'far Sahraroudi, was previously the commander of Ramadhan Headquarters. He was the field commander involved in the assassination of Abdul-Rahman Qassemlou in Vienna in the summer of 1989 (see Chapter X). Carrying a fake passport with the name of Rahimi, Sahraroudi was arrested by the Austrian police. Following the regime's intervention, however, the Austrian government sent him to Tehran.
The commander of the Training Directorate is Guards Corps Brigadier General Shams. He was the ex-commander of a G.C. base in northwest Iran, subordinate to Ramadhan Headquarters. Subsequently, he headed the 9th Badr Division, comprising Iraqi POWs and nationals who joined the Iranian regime's forces. Shams commanded the regime's forces sent into Iraq in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War. After the unrest in southern Iraq subsided, Shams became the commander of operations in northern Iraq. His deputy, Orouj, commands the Imam Ali training garrison in Tehran. Before his appointment to this post, Orouj was the commander of the Guards Corps Special Security Corps and in charge of Khamenei's bodyguard unit.
Another major section of the Qods Force is its Directorate of Finance , headed by Talebi. Because of the Qods Force's extraterritorial activities, the Directorate has been divided into two sections, one of which makes the financial arrangements for the forces sent abroad. Other key officers of the Qods Force include Manshavi, the head of the Commandant's Office, and Ahmad Salek, Khamenei's representative to the Force. Before the inception of the Qods Force, Manshavi commanded the extraterritorial forces of the G.C. General Staff. He also commanded the Sudanese nationals trained in Iran. Before being transferred to the Qods Force, mullah Salek was the commander in chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Komitehs, which later merged with the national police to form the State Security Forces. Salek is also the director of the Bureau of Islamic Movements in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a majlis deputy, and a member of the Assembly of Experts. He has played an instrumental role in the regime's terrorist actions abroad since 1979. He was also a key figure in the post-Persian Gulf War disturbances in Iraq. Salek attends a meeting with Khamenei every Tuesday.
In addition to the military staff, the Qods Force has a politically oriented staff called the General Staff for the Export of Revolution that handles the export of fundamentalism and terrorism to different countries. Specific assignments are surveyed and parceled out to different directorates of the Qods Force, including the directorates for:
1. Iraq
2. Palestine, Lebanon, and Jordan
3. Turkey
4. Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Indian subcontinent
5. Western countries (Europe, United States)
6. North Africa (Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Sudan, and Morocco)
7. Arabian Peninsula
8. Republics of the former Soviet Union
According to a Qods Force official, the General Staff for the Export of Revolution was formed with the objective of "removing a fundamental weakness" of the regime's past policy of exporting of revolution. As he put it: "Despite our prior extensive military activities in these countries, the absence of a clear political superstructure did not allow us to reap the maximum benefit from these activities. Now, we are striving to have our own political groups or alternatives in each of these countries, so that our work will bear results."l0
Each directorate of the General Staff for the Export of Revolution is responsible for establishing political ties with individuals and forces within the country under its jurisdiction to lure them to Khomeini's ideology. For instance, there have been large-scale efforts to forge relations with factions of the Muslim Brotherhood or other religious forces in the Arab countries. Meanwhile, the General Staff for the Export of Revolution has also been active against the regime's opponents. A close confidant of Rafsanjani describes these activities:
The issue of the Mojahedin concerns the Qods Force. The Qods Force has different directorates for different countries. For example, there are directorates for Turkey, Iraq, Afghanistan, etc. If the Iranian nationals-the Mojahedin, the counter-revolutionaries, and so on-engage in some kind of activity against the Islamic Republic, these directorates handle their cases and make the appropriate decisions.11
The Qods Force has several command headquarters and bases across Iran where both Iranians and foreign nationals are recruited and trained before being sent abroad. The Qods Force's major training centers include the Imam Ali University, Shahid Kazemi, Beheshti, and Vali-e-asr garrisons. The Force also has special operational units stationed in safe houses in Tehran. They are subjected to rigid intelligence and security restrictions. This is to limit intelligence leaks on other members as well as on the objectives of the special units should any of them be captured in the target country.
The following Guard Corps units are under the command of the Qods Force: The 1st Corps (Ramadhan Headquarters), based in Kermanshah (western Iran); the 2nd (Lebanon) Corps; the 3rd (Hamzeh) Corps, based near Oroumieh, northwestern Iran; the 4th (Ansar) Corps, based in Mashad, northeastern Iran; Corps 5,000; Corps 6,000 (Africa Corps); the 7th Corps; the 8th Corps; and the 9th Badr Corps.
1st Corps, or Ramadhan Headquarters
The 1st Corps began its operations during the Iran-Iraq War and is charged with organizing and providing training and logistics for Kurdish and other small Iraqi groups, as well as gathering operational intelligence. Given its assignments, the organization of this Corps is different from any other G.C. headquarters. The 1st Corps carries out its tasks through five operational bases along the Iran-Iraq border and several tactical bases and posts at various sections of the northwestern, western, and southern fronts: Nasr Garrison in Naqadeh, Fatah Garrison in Sardasht, and Ra'd Garrison in Marivan in Iran's northwest; Zafar Garrison in Sarpol-Zahab in the west; and Fajr Garrison in Zaytoun Mahaleh in Ahwaz in the southwest.
Each of these garrisons has several affiliate command posts. For instance, the Nasr Garrison in Naqadeh has command posts in Piranshahr, Oshnavieh, Badinabad, and Ziveh. It also operates tactical posts in Galirash, Irbil, and Dohuk within Iraq. The 1st Corps' training centers are located in Sabetkhah Training Camp in Gilan-e-Gharb (west) and Ghayour Training Camp in Ahwaz (southwest). When necessary, this Corps coordinates with other bases to use their training camps. Among them are Montazeri Garrison in Kermanshah, Qods Training Camp in Hamedan, and Khatam ol-Anbia Training Camp in Tehran.
In 1991 and 1992, the 1st Corps devoted enormous energy to the assassination of Massoud Rajavi. It was also responsible for a car bomb outside the Sheraton Hotel in Baghdad in January 1992.
The command headquarters of the 2nd (Lebanon) Corps is in Damascus, and its forces are stationed in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley. Its main task in Tehran is to provide the Corps in Lebanon with adequate manpower and logistical support. Except for a limited number of permanent personnel, the core of the 2nd Corps' units are changed every three months.
The Hamzeh Headquarters is under the direct supervision of the Guards Corps General Staff. It commands the Qods Force's logistics in northern Iraq and Turkey. The 3rd Corps also provides logistical support for the regime's forces in Turkey and northern Iraq that are connected with the Corps 5,000 (see below), as well as to the 1st Corps (Ramadhan Headquarters(
The 3rd Corps is commanded by G.C. Brigadier General Kamal Hedayat, who works under G. C. Commander in Chief Mohsen Rezaii. The 3rd Corps' activities in Turkey are reported to Ahmad Vahidi. The Golkhaneh Training Center in Oroumieh (northwest) is one of the 3rd Corps' training centers.
One of the most recent operations the 3rd Corps carried out in coordination with the Corps 5,000 was the assassination of a foreign diplomat in Ankara in March 1992. Javad Tale'i, a Qods Force Commander, directed this operation. Prior to the operation, a Tehran daily had warned Turkey that terrorist groups affiliated with the mullahs' regime would launch subversive operations against Ankara. "Iran must respond appropriately to the confiscation [of the Cape Males cargo ship carrying weapons for the mullahs' regime.] If that entails an eye for an eye, so be it," the daily said.12
The 4th Corps previously operated in the framework of the Ansar Headquarters and was charged with the Guards Corps activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan. After the Qods Force was formed, the 8th Samen ol-A'emmeh Corps was strengthened, reorganized, and renamed the 4th Ansar Corps, commanded by G.C. Brigadier General Isma'il Qa'ani, former commander of the G.C. 8th Corps.
The 4th Ansar Corps' main task has been to organize and provide logistics for the Shi'ite Afghan groups residing in Iran. It has also trained and dispatched terrorist squads to Pakistan to assassinate Iranian refugees and Mojahedin activists. Examples include the extensive attacks on the Mojahedin residences in Karachi and Quetta in July 1987. To carry out these tasks, the Ansar Corps has set up bases in Taibad, Zahedan, Zabol, and Birjand along Iran's eastern borders. Forces that are dispatched to Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kashmir, and India depart from these bases.
The disintegration of the former Soviet Union and the subsequent fall of the communist regime in Afghanistan suddenly placed great demands on the 4th Ansar Corps. New manpower and budget were infused into the Corps. Central Asia became its highest priority for export of revolution, dispatch of Islamic missionaries, and establishment of direct contacts with fundamentalist groups in the republics.
On February 11, 1992, five members of the Qods Force were arrested by Turkmen border guards while trying to enter the country illegally. They were armed with automatic rifles and grenades and planned to enter Turkmenistan via the Sarakhs border region. The 4th Ansar Corps has also set up a base in the border town of Maku to infiltrate its forces into the Azerbaijan Republic.
Corps 5,000 is more limited in numbers than other parts of the Qods Force, but it consists of highly experienced assassination and bombing squads. Their members are chiefly stationed in clandestine safe houses in Tehran and foreign countries. Their contacts are secret and their essential task is to put into action special operations in the target regions, especially Western countries, including Turkey. Foreign nationals are also members of this Corps. Corps 5,000 is responsible for all of Tehran's terrorist activities in Turkey. Receiving logistical support from the 3rd (Hamzeh) Corps, Corps 5,000 has its own independent bases in Iran's western frontier, including its operational headquarters located in Oroumieh, capital of the northwestern province of West-Azerbaijan. The Corps' central command is on Tehran's Pasdaran Street, near the Ministry of Intelligence.
Corps 5,000 planned and executed the regime's biggest terrorist operation in Turkey in the first half of 1992, against the People's Mojahedin Organization. On June 4, terrorist units kidnapped Ali, Akbar Ghorbani, a Mojahedin member, in the Shishli district of Istanbul. Ghorbani's mutilated body was found by the Turkish police on January 108 31 in Cinarcik, a suburb forty-five kilometers southeast of Istanbul. Interrogation of terrorists arrested for the car-bomb murder of Ugur Mumcu, a Turkish journalist, a few days earlier led to the discovery of Ghorbani's body. Before murdering him, the mullahs' terrorists had severely tortured him, pulling out his fingernails and slashing his genitals.13 The Corps 5,000 also planted two 50-kilogram bombs in two Mojahedin cars on June 5. The subsequent explosions inflicted heavy damage to the neighboring areas.
The forces of the Malek Ashtar Brigade were transferred to Corps 5,000 after the Qods Force was formed. This brigade previously belonged to the Ramadhan Headquarters and took part in irregular warfare inside Iraq. The Malek Ashtar forces also held positions for some time at the Iran-Iraq southern front. After being incorporated into the Qods Force, this unit was organized in safe houses in Tehran. They were directly involved in the April 1990 assassination of Kazem Rajavi in Geneva.
Corps 5,000 has also sent assassination squads to Britain, Japan, Italy, Switzerland, Germany, and elsewhere. The Corps' operations include the murder of the Japanese translator of the Satanic Verses and an assassination attempt on the life of its Italian translator in summer 1991. It also assassinated Shapour Bakhtiar, the shah's last prime minister, in France in August 1991 in coordination with the 2nd (Lebanon) Corps. Corps 5,000 operational officers were also involved in the explosion of the Pan Am flight over Lockerbie, Scotland, as well as the March 1992 explosion at the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires.
A senior official of the mullahs' regime commented on the role of the Qods Force and its Corps 5,000 in assassinations abroad:
The Qods Force does not operate in partisan methods. Neither does it get involved in the destruction of a garrison, a petrochemical base, or a bridge. Nor does it have a military target. The Qods Force wants its men to carry out operations abroad and return to the country, or reconnoiter individuals as subjects for operations by the special forces. These are the tasks of the Qods Force's Corps 5,000 and 6,000. That is what they do, and they are presently training their men for such purposes. A number of these people are stationed at the Guards Corps General Staff, and some of them have been distributed in Shahid Kazemi building, Imam Ali Garrison in north Tehran, and across the capital. They do not have any specific place. Some stay in houses we have rented for them in Tehran. . . . These operational units include expatriates from Islamic countries, like Lebanon and Syria.14
Corps 6,000 is entrusted with the task of exporting fundamentalism to African countries, with the Arab countries of North Africa enjoying top priority. The embassies and cultural centers affiliated with the Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance recruit the ideal individuals in each country. They are subsequently sent to Tehran to undergo political-ideological and military training. They thus acquire adequate preparations to implement their missions, including formation of resistance groups or carrying out terrorist acts, in their respective countries.
Sudan has been turned into the Qods Force's Headquarters in North Africa. The Force is currently centered in the Shambat and Koravi regions and is setting up more camps at the cost of $20 million. The instructional staff comes from the Force's Tehran headquarters. The commander of the base, Majid Kamal, spent the 1980s in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley, helping to organize the Hizbullah in Lebanon. The recruits trained in these bases come from North Africa (Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, and Algeria), but there are some also from Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries. After receiving theoretical and practical training the recruits are taken to southern Sudan for real combat.
The 9th Badr Corps, made up largely of Iraqi POWs, works closely with the 1st Corps (Ramadhan Headquarters) in training for activities inside Iraq's territory.
The commander of the Training Directorate is G.C. Brigadier General Shams, whose deputy is Orouj. The Imam Ali University is the Qods Force's main training center. Located north of the former Sa'dabad Palace in northern Tehran (the headquarters for the shah's Imperial Guard Division), it serves as a terrorist training center for non-Iranian mercenaries. Courses in politics, ideology, demolition, explosives, shooting from a mobile position, weapons training, ambush and counter ambush, pursuit and surveillance, fitness, and hand-to-hand combat are taught there.
Most of the instructors at the university have had a long record in extraterritorial operations. Orouj and Shams also offer instruction themselves. In cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the garrison's personnel department makes travel arrangements for expatriates due to arrive at the university for training. Kuwaiti nationals reportedly received training in the university's April-June 1991 term, and the recruits for the next term were from Kashmir. In a confidential report to the Qods Command in the wake of the assassination of Bakhtiar, an official of this university wrote: "Should we strengthen such training, it will provide us with suitable leverage around the world."15
The Qods Force also operates a college in Qom called Beit ol-Moqaddas. It is also known as the Melal (Nations) Training Center, because recruits come from different countries. The college offers ideological instructions which are quite different from the traditional teachings at Qom's seminaries. Eighteen Turkish nationals arrested for the car bomb murder of Turkish journalist Ugur Mumcu in Ankara in January 1993 told investigators that they had received training at this center.16 Khatam and Qa' em centers operate under the jurisdiction of this college. The Khatam Center is in charge of identifying and recruiting forces abroad and the Qa'em Center handles the instructions.
The Beit ol-Moqaddas college offers a six-month curriculum. More than 100 Lebanese, a large number of Iraqis and Turkish nationals, and about 70 Afghan Shi'ites, as well as the 9th Badr Corps' battalion and more senior commanders, have taken the Qa'em training courses. Other instructional garrisons include Beheshti and Vali-e-asr garrisons in Tehran. Their training periods are from three to nine months.*
