III
In all affairs, the Pivotal role of the velayat-e-faqih must be accepted as fundamental.
-Hashemi-Rafsanjani, October 10, 19911
Khomeini's death on June 3, 1989, deprived the Tehran regime of the sole person capable of uniting its disparate political and ideological factions. A few months before his death, Khomeini had dismissed Hussein-Ali Montazeri, his officially designated successor, for Montazeri's "weak and flexible approach" to the Mojahedin.2 Montazeri had, in a series of letters to Khomeini, objected to the massacre on Khomeini's order of thousands of Mojahedin political prisoners immediately after the 1988 cease-fire in the Iran- Iraq War. "This kind of massacre without trials of prisoners and captives will definitely benefit [the Mojahedin] in the long run," Montazeri wrote. "The world will condemn us and they will be further encouraged to wage armed struggle. It is wrong to kill to contain thoughts and ideas. . . . The People's Mojahedin are not individuals; they are an ideology and a worldview. They have a logic. It takes right logic to answer wrong logic. You cannot solve the problem with killings; it will only spread."3
With Montazeri gone, Khomeini's death confronted his regime with a succession crisis. Fearing that the absence of a leader could mean imminent collapse or overthrow, the ruling mullahs of the Assembly of Experts were compelled to act quickly. They appointed Ali Khamenei as vali-e-faqih even though his credentials were clearly deficient. Khamenei's rank of hojjatolislam (a relatively junior position in the Shi'ite clerical hierarchy) did not meet the constitutional requirement that the faqih have the rank of marja'iat, or superior standing within the Shi'ite clerical hierarchy with some following among the faithful. He was promoted to ayatollah overnight. But he still fell far short of being qualified for the velayat-e-faqih, prompting Khomeini's heirs to attempt to make the constitution subordinate to velayat-e-faqih.
The day after Khamenei's appointment, Ahmad Azari-Qomi, an influential member of the Assembly of Experts, argued: "Let's suppose that Ayatollah Khamenei's election apparently violates the letter of the Constitution. But does the spirit of the Constitution permit the Islamic Republic to remain without a leader? I believe that anyone appointed to this post by the Assembly of Experts is the Vali-e-amr [Guardian of All Affairs] of Muslims, and obedience to him is obligatory, although he might not be a faqih. 4"
Abolqassem Khaz'ali, another member of the Assembly of Experts, also reasoned: "Marja'iat is not the problem at hand. For the time being, due to the need of the society, the experts deemed it appropriate to choose. . . someone with insight and management skills."5
A propaganda campaign was also launched to solicit the bei' at (oath of allegiance) to Khamenei from the regime's foreign proxies in a bid to reinforce his position at home. Among those who swore loyalty to Khamenei, according to Tehran radio, were the leader of the Lebanese Hizbullah; Ahmed Jibril, leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC); Muhammad-Hussein Fadhlullah, a senior Lebanese Shi'ite cleric; and the head of the Shi'ite Clerical Center in Pakistan.
As "Vali-e-faqih of the World's Muslims" and "Leader of the Global Islamic Revolution," Khamenei from the outset of his rise to power stressed the need to continue Khomeini's policies. "Iran's Islamic revolution cannot be confined within borders, nations, or ethnic groups," Khamenei told a visiting delegation of the Lebanese Hizbullah group. "It is in our revolution's interest, and an essential principle, that when we speak of Islamic objectives, we address all the Muslims of the world, and when we speak of the Arrogant West, we address all the oppressors of the world."6
He and other clerical leaders have also repeatedly stressed the importance of velayat-e-faqih and the need to obey it since Khomeini's death. "Ayatollah Khamenei said opposition to velayat-e-faqih is tantamount to opposing the most essential principles and fundamental bases of the Islamic Republic," Tehran radio reported. "Ayatollah Khamenei said, 'According to the Constitution, the positions declared by the leadership apparatus are the principal policies of the State. Those who oppose these positions at critical junctures are doubtless opposed to velayat-e-faqih."'7
Such assertions were subsequently echoed by other Iranian officials. "The gravest danger threatening our revolution is disobedience to velayat-e-faqih," emphasized Mullah Mohsen Shabestari, a member of the Assembly of Experts. "We do not have any disputes over the principles of the revolution and loyalty to the State. We are all followers of the Imam's Line and the Leader."8 Muhammad-Sa'id Raja'i-Khorassani, former ambassador to the United Nations and later a majlis deputy, remarked: "Velayat-e-faqih is the principle to be preserved and safeguarded in all the organizations and classes of our society."9
With Khomeini's death, the entire velayat-e-faqih regime was endangered because the religious charisma and marja'iat which safeguarded the system were gone. Khomeini's heirs therefore defied the expectations of foreign observers who believed that Khomeini's death would mean the end of the velayat-e-faqih and the beginning of moderation. They soon formally recognized the principle of absolute rule. In an attempt to keep the Islamic Republic on its feet, they revised the constitution to enhance the status of the vali-e-faqih and gave him more authority. For example, the post of the prime minister was eliminated and, more importantly, the president became even more dependent on the vali-e-faqih.
Other parts of the constitution were also changed to strengthen the vali-e-faqih:
Principle 5: Among the criteria originally set for the selection of the vali-e-faqih was his acceptance by the majority of the populace. This stipulation was deleted from the new constitution; henceforth, the vali would be chosen, not nominated or approved, by the Assembly of Experts. In addition, Principle 107 in the original constitution stated that a council whose members qualified for the post could serve jointly as velayat-e-faqih. This possibility was also omitted and the velayat-e-faqih restricted to an individual.
Principle 57: The original constitution designated the president as the supreme coordinator of the three branches of government. The new constitution entrusted this prerogative to the vali-e-faqih. With the post of prime minister eliminated, the president was put in charge of running the executive branch and forming the cabinet.
Principle 109: The key qualification originally specified in this principle for the vali-e-faqih was that the candidate be a marja-e-taqlid (preeminent jurist with followers.) The new constitution contains no such stipulation.
Principle 110: The powers of the vali-e-faqih were dramatically increased, giving him control over almost everything. His powers are enumerated as follows:
A. Determining the general policies of the Islamic Republic in consultation with the Council for the Determination of Exigencies of the State;
B. Supervising the proper implementation of the general policies;
C. Ordering referendums;
D. Supreme command of the Armed Forces;
E. Declaring war, peace, and troop mobilization;
F. Appointing, dismissing, and accepting the resignations of the:
1 Members of the Council of Guardians
2 Head of the Judiciary
3 Director of the Voice and Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Radio and Television Organization)
4 chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
5 Commander in Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
6 Commanders in Chief of the military and security forces;
G. Resolving differences and regulating relations among the three branches of government;
H. Resolving, by means of the Council for the Determination of Exigencies of the State, problems which cannot be resolved by ordinary means;
I. Signing the decree naming the President after popular elections. The competence of presidential candidates, as per the conditions stipulated by the Constitution, must be approved prior to the elections by the Council of Guardians and confirmed by the Imam during the first electoral round;
J. Impeaching the president for reasons of national interest pursuant to a verdict by the Supreme Court confirming his violation of his legal duties or a vote of no confidence by the Islamic Consultative Assembly, as per Principle 89;
K. Pardoning convicts or commuting their sentences in accordance with Islamic criteria and subsequent to a request from the Head of the Judiciary.
The vali may on occasions delegate his duties and powers to other persons.
Principle 113: The right to regulate the relations of the three branches is withdrawn from the president and transferred to the vali-e-faqih. The president heads the executive branch, but his powers are limited by the clause that says "except those affairs directly relevant to the vali-e-faqih."
Principle 122: The original constitution specified that the president was accountable only to the populace. This article adds that he is also accountable to the vali-e-faqih.
Principle 130: The revised constitution includes an article stipulating that the president submit his resignation to the vali-e-faqih.
Principle 131: In the case of the death, dismissal, resignation, or illness of the president, the original constitution provided for the formation of a council of certain people who would carry out his duties. The new constitution stipulates that, with the vali-e-faqih's approval, the first deputy president would carry on. In the absence of a first deputy, the vali-e-faqih is to appoint the new president.
Principles 157 and 158: According to these two articles in the new constitution, a single individual appointed by the vali-e-faqih heads the judicial branch. The original version provided for the formation of a Supreme Judicial Council consisting of five members, two of whom were appointed by the vali-e-faqih in consultation with the Supreme Court judges and three of whom were chosen by their peers.10
In the years after Khomeini's death, his regime's fundamental policies have undergone no significant changes. Mass executions and torture have persisted. The United Nations Human Rights Sub-Commission noted in a resolution that the number of executions had tripled between 1990 and 1991. In March 1992, the UN Human Rights Commission expressed grave concern about the persistence of human rights violations in Iran, including the increase in the number of executions. Human rights were systematically violated, and women continue to be denied their fundamental rights. The foreign policy of Khomeini's heirs is more sophisticated in strategy and tactics, and encompasses a broader scale, but the objective remains the same: export of the Islamic revolution. As Hashemi-Rafsanjani, who became president in July 1989, spelled out, "Conditions might have changed, but our policy has not."11
There have been no basic changes, despite the much noted gestures of moderation by Rafsanjani, for the simple reason that the medieval doctrine of velayat-e-faqih, the theocracy's body and soul, renders the system intrinsically incapable of moderation. The system is in a delicate balance; a crack in its pillars would rapidly become a rift, bringing down the entire system.
To be sure, there are factions within the political system. They do occasionally come into serious conflict, especially over the distribution of power. But such differences are clearly of secondary importance, because the interests of all of the regime's leaders and major factions dictate allegiance to the doctrine of velayat-e-faqih, upon which all of their fortunes ride. The search for a moderate trend within the clerical oligarchy is, therefore, an exercise in futility. A "moderate velayat-e-faqih" is a contradiction in terms. For each of the regime's factions, breaking out of the theocratic mold altogether is tantamount to rejecting their own political and ideological justification. The velayat-e-faqih legitimizes the system as a whole and the role within it of each individual cleric, including Rafsanjani.
Rafsanjani, often described as a "moderate" in the West, has acknowledged being one of the five top aides, perhaps foremost among them, who made all key decisions during the eleven years of Khomeini's rule. He admits, "Despite poisonous imperialist propaganda-which tries to project the idea that the Iranian nation is hopeful of entering a new era and choosing a new path - I am confident that we and our people will choose nothing else. I myself have been one of this regime's decision makers. Should anyone seek to question the country's five top officials regarding the national affairs, certainly I have been one of them."12 Rafsanjani had established himself as Khomeini's most trusted lieutenant by the time Khomeini died, closer to him even than Muhammad Hussein Beheshti had been.13 In 1979, it was Rafsanjani who, on Khomeini's behalf, handed the prime ministerial decree to the first post revolutionary prime minister, Mehdi Bazargan, although the ceremonies were attended by mullahs of more senior rank, including Beheshti and Abdulkarim Moussavi-Ardebili, who was appointed chief justice afterwards. In 1988, when Mir-Hussein Moussavi submitted his resignation after eight years as prime minister, Khomeini rebuked him for not seeking out officials of superior standing, pointing specifically to Rafsanjani, then Speaker of the Majlis.
If we, nevertheless, assume that Rafsanjani is now earnestly seeking to make an about-face and move toward moderation, can he do it? He is confronted with a dilemma: If he leaves the velayat-e-faqih intact, moderation becomes impossible. But if he begins to dismantle the velayat-e-faqih, he is dismantling the foundations upon which he stands. To allow political freedoms, loosen the restrictions on parties and the press, and remove the obstacles to public gatherings would set in motion a process which would fatally weaken Rafsanjani's grip on power. Had such a potential for change existed within the regime, there would have been no need for 100,000 political executions. Even in the simplest terms, allowing public gatherings would provide the means for the friends and relatives of these victims, as well as those of the 150,000 victims of torture, to unite. Rafsanjani cannot be assumed to have forgotten the final months of the shah's rule.14
Political freedoms, therefore, are too much to expect. Rafsanjani, however, might at least take more modest steps: observing social freedoms, respecting women's rights, stopping interference in people's private lives, ending political and religious persecution, complying with the accepted norms of international conduct. In other words, he could choose to be content with the role of a twentieth-century dictator, like the shah, and relinquish the religious character of the regime, which lends it a distinctively medieval flavor. But if such a change were made, Rafsanjani would be among the first to go, because he is himself a cleric. A secular dictatorship has no need of clerical tyrants; in every third world country are generals and technocrats ready and willing to do the job.
Even analysts who regard Rafsanjani as a "realist" admit that a metamorphosis of the "Islamic Republic" from within is an impossible task. One analyst, calling Rafsanjani's rule the "Second Republic," wrote: "What the realists [Rafsanjani's faction], perhaps to their peril, do not realize is that it may yet require a complete metamorphosis before the ghost of the First Republic can be laid to rest; and this is a feat which looks as if it might be beyond the natural capacities of the children of that First Republic. One thing they realize, though, is that if such a metamorphosis were to take place, the end-product would more than likely bear no resemblance to an Islamic Republic at all."15
Any moderation or reform in the mullahs' regime, therefore, presupposes a weakening or elimination of the velayat-e-faqih, which implies an end to the regime itself. Rafsanjani, like his regime, is neither inclined to, nor capable of, moderation. In founding his theocracy on the doctrine of velayat-e-faqih, Khomeini implanted within it the seed of its own destruction, the inability to change.
