I
A Brief History of Fundamentalism
Let there be no compulsion in religion.
-Holy Quran, Sura II, Baqara, Verse 2561
In critically analyzing the history of Islam, experts and orientalists have generally seen the Shi'ah-Sunni conflict as the main source of strife within the Muslim communities. This conflict has certainly continued at various times and to various degrees, whether in the form of scholarly debates and canonical discussions or bloody confrontations. Often overlooked, however, is the profound antagonism between the opposing interpretations of Islamic ideology and the message of revelation, a conflict which has persisted for fourteen centuries, since the founding of the Islamic community in the seventh century by Prophet Muhammad.
On one side is the dogmatic outlook, which is unable to comprehend the true essence of the teachings of the Quran and the Prophet of Islam, i.e. mercy, liberty, and guidance of the individual and society toward moral and material evolution. To the dogmatist, compassion, love, freedom, and progress are not absolute values; the tendency is toward brutality, vengeance, intolerance, ignorance, and superstition. These qualities contradict the approach and practices of Islam's great Prophet. Fourteen centuries after the birth of Islam, Muhammad continues to symbolize to his followers all the sublime qualities of a human being. The hopes for the one who has been sent as "mercy for the worlds" and will intercede for his followers on Doomsday are extremely high, especially among the masses.2
Throughout the history of Islam, there have also been Muslims who followed Muhammad's genuine message of mercy and liberty from the Quran, rejecting dogmatism and fanaticism despite threats of excommunication or charges of heresy. This ideological clash has never been limited to Shi'ites versus Sunnis. It has persisted to varying degrees within all Islamic communities. Conflicting ideological interpretations are common to all religions. With Islam, however, the issues have immediate political overtones more volatile than theoretical discussions or academic disputes. The conflicts may last for centuries, because Islam's distinctive characteristic is a model of life, not just of worship. Hence, differing interpretations of the teachings of Islam directly and immediately translate into political conflicts.
A closer look at this linkage of politics and religious sentiments of the Muslim masses is essential to understanding how religious demagogues and fundamentalists - chief among them Khomeini - have exploited this bond to usurp power, and why Marxism, nationalism, and liberalism (especially in their antireligious form) have failed to serve as an alternative to the religious forces in the Islamic world. The only alternative capable of countering fundamentalism is modern, democratic Islam, which opposes the union of church and state, for both political and religious reasons.
Throughout the tortuous history of the Islamic world, religious attitudes have been interwoven with politics. Researchers rarely find a political philosophy that has not been influenced by the indigenous religious culture. All intellectual trends in the past century that aimed to eliminate Islam from the political life of Muslim society were unable to extend their reach beyond small intellectual or academic circles. This singular characteristic of Islamic societies colors the specific demands of the masses and their image of the ideal society. Iran and Algeria provide clear examples.
In the course of Iran's antimonarchic revolution in 1978-79, foreign journalists interviewed a large number of "revolutionaries," including youths, white-collar workers, housewives, and bazaar merchants, all of whom aspired for the revival of Islamic values in society. When asked their specific demands, they usually gave similar answers: liberty, freedom of the press, a multiparty system, justice, full realization of social and political rights, and an end to censorship, repression, unemployment, economic privation, corruption and bribery. All insisted that Islam would meet these demands.
Fourteen years later, antigovernment protesters in Algeria cite similar reasons for their chants of "Islam is the only solution."3
The difference, however, is that for more than a decade the people of Iran have gone through a painful process of disillusionment with Khomeiniism and its demagogic promises, medieval philosophy, administrative incompetence, and reign of terror. Ironically, while Khomeini, his heirs, and his reactionary ideology are held in deep contempt by the majority of Iranians, his brand of Islamic fundamentalism still finds some appeal in Muslim societies far away from Iran's borders. But the youth of Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and many other Muslim countries know little if anything about Khomeini's decrees against the Muslim Mojahedin, such as permitting the Guards to drain the blood of the Mojahedin before execution, or sanctioning the rape of Mojahedin women on the eve of their execution.4 Iranian propaganda depicts Khomeini as a paragon of Islamic virtue.
Khomeini was, of course, not the first ruler in the history of Islam to take advantage of the canon to justify his authoritarian dictatorship. Many tyrants and oppressive sultans used the clergy to legitimize their despotic rule and justify their suppressive policies. In post Islamic Iran, however, Khomeini was one of the very few faqihs, or "scholars of Islam," to propose that Muslim clergymen take the reins of political power in their own hands, and certainly the first one who actually seized power.
The first thing Prophet Muhammad did when his army of Muslims conquered the city of Mecca in January A.D. 630 was to declare a general amnesty. The people of Mecca were free to choose or reject Islam. Among the pardoned were the powerful leaders of the Quraysh tribe who were guilty of unspeakable atrocities against Muslims. For years they had harassed and hounded the Prophet and organized more than one attempt on his life. This first act as ruler attests to the spirit of the man entitled the Messenger of Compassion and Emancipation. The life of the Prophet of Islam glows with examples of forgiveness and mercy and with a love for the lofty ideals of the human race. His eminent traits reflect the teachings of Islam and the Quran, the holy book whose every chapter begins "In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful"
There were instances, even during the Prophet's lifetime, when some of his followers - and occasionally even his close companions - were at a loss to understand the noble spirit of Muhammad's actions and decisions, and protested to him. Such encounters have been recorded, for example, when the Prophet signed the Al-Hudaybiyah peace pact with the Meccan leaders one year before the conquest of Mecca, and when he pardoned a Muslim who had fled Medina to join Muhammad's enemies, but was captured en route to Mecca. That some early Muslims argued against such decisions by Muhammad emanated from their inability to grasp the profoundly humanitarian essence of the message of Islam and its rejection of the notion that human character is immutable.
Kharajites: First Advocates of Dogmatism
The Kharajites (seceders) were among the first historical examples of dogmatism and fanaticism in the name of Islam5. During the caliphate of Ali ibn Abi Taleb (the Prophet's son-in-law and cousin, and the first Shi'ite Imam), a group of Muslims rebelled, with the motto "la hokmo illa lellah" (there are no verdicts but God's), forming the anarchist sect of the Kharajites. One of them assassinated Ali in 661.
The Kharajites continued to exist as a rebel group for two centuries, then disintegrated and virtually disappeared as a sect. They are note-worthy, however, because they were the first to advocate a fundamentalist outlook of Islam and the Quran as their official ideology, opposing any dynamic interpretation of the Quran which Ali pioneered and symbolized. The Kharajites also espoused a formalistic interpretation of the Quranic command to "enjoin good and forbid evil" as vindicating truth with the sword. Their anarchist ideology made the Kharajites highly inflammatory terrorists intolerant of established political authority or almost any opposition to their views.
The Kharajites rebelled against a unique man. Ali was foremost among Muslims for his profound understanding of the Quran and the Prophet's tradition and his tolerance for opposition and of those who criticized him personally. The confrontation between the Kharajite zealots and Ali was the first ideological battle between two diametrically opposed interpretations of Islam.
Ali spent many long days arguing with the Kharajites, convincing several thousand of them to leave the rebels' ranks. Pointing, for example, to the Kharajites' formalistic manipulation of the verses of the Quran to justify their dogmatic viewpoints, Ali said: "They are the ones who use (some) words of the truth to allow falsehood to prevail."6 The Kharajites left a legacy of zealotry and dogmatism which continues to influence a wide range of Islamic political thought. Some contemporary fundamentalists continue to admire the Kharajites for their "strong will and righteous deeds."7
Within the spectrum of Islamic fanaticism, the Kharajites represented the anarchist tendency. Most of history's Islamic fundamentalists, however, have rationalized and legitimized the despotic, authoritarian governments in power. For the most part, they were members of the clergy and religious jurists, although at times even the theories of the most renowned Islamic philosophers were used in practice to serve the very same purpose.
Islam's history shows a clear demarcation between that group of jurists and thinkers who contrary to the teachings of the Quran and the Prophet provided religious justification for oppression by despotic rulers, and the philosophers, scientists, and movements which resisted this distortion of Islam. Between the eleventh and fourteenth centuries, for instance, the Sunni clergy demonstrated more flexibility than their Shi'ite counterparts in adapting their views to those of ruling regimes. But once Shi'ism was established as the official religion in Iran by the Safavid dynasty (sixteenth century), many Shi'ite clerics also legitimized the despot in power. There was a readiness, even among distinguished Muslim scholars, to accept the most tyrannical rule, as long as it could to some degree guarantee the community's security and peace. In the eleventh century, Abu Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazzali, one of the most revered philosophers in the history of Islam, wrote: "These days, the government is completely dependent on military power. The (rightful) caliph is whomever the holders of military power vow allegiance to."8
The tolerance of despotism finally reached a point where security alone took precedence, not freedom and justice. Many jurists paid more heed to a ruler's ability to keep law and order than to his honesty or piety. Ibn Taymiyah, another famous Islamic scholar (thirteenth century), wrote: "It is far better even that an oppressive sultan seize power than that no man take charge. As is said, sixty years under an oppressive ruler is better than one night without a ruler."9 To that effect, "tyranny is better than anarchy became a favorite theme of the Jurists."10
According to the orientalist A. Von Kremer, "In the final run, therefore, the Muhammadan jurisprudence transformed into a theory of unlimited acceptance and recognition of the rights of the most powerful. . . . No longer were there talks of a bilateral contract between the ruler and his subjects or of their right to oust an oppressive caliph."11 In general this notion advocated that for the Muslims "the civil duty of the subject was obedience; . . . only when the faith itself was in danger had he the right, under proper leadership, to resort to force." 12
Judge Abu Bakr Al-Baghlani, a tenth-century statesman and the Abbasid caliph's ambassador to Constantinople, wrote in his book Al Tamheed: "The Caliph cannot be deposed and it is not permissible to revolt against him even if he were corrupt and oppressive, or plundered the ummah's [nation's] wealth, or crushed the people under the blows of his whip, or violated all divine laws. He should only be given counsel."13
Ten centuries later, in presenting the theory of the "absolute sovereignty of the jurist," Khomeini virtually repeated the words of Judge Abu Bakr Al-Baghlani. The only, yet very important, difference was that Judge Abu Bakr and others endorsed the rule of someone else, while Khomeini was himself in power.
Numerous cases exist of arbitrary distortions of the teachings of Islam throughout its history. Hafiz Yahya Al-Nawawi, a jurist and chief of the Syrian Dar Al-Hadith (center for the collection of narrated traditions of the Prophet), for example, wrote in the thirteenth century: "Muslims concur that despite the corruption and oppression of a caliph or a ruler, rebellion and waging war on him are forbidden."
The Prophet's traditions have disappeared altogether from the words of such jurists. The Prophet is quoted as saying: "The most precious martyr in my ummah is he who rebels against a tyrannical leader, enjoins him to good, forbids him from evil and is killed by him." The Prophet's own grandson, Hussein bin Ali, rebelled along with his family and disciples against the corrupt ruler of his time, Yazid, and was slain in battle in the seventh century. The democratic and freedom-loving tradition of Prophet Muhammad was gradually distorted over time as despotic fundamentalists (or "traditionalists") veiled their backward views in the guise of Islam. The Umayyad (661 to 750) and Abbasid (750 to 1258) dynasties issued orders for the torture, pursuit and inquisition of their opponents, primarily the Prophet's descendents and their supporters. A few centuries later, Shah Isma'il, founder of Iran's Safavid dynasty, ordered the harshest punishment inflicted on anyone who refused to insult Abu Bakr and Umar (the two caliphs who succeeded the Prophet), resulting in the massacre of numerous Sunni sheikhs.
Democratic, Antireactionary Islamic Movements
The history of Islam and specifically Iran also contains a considerable number of movements and thinkers who steadfastly resisted despotic rulers and who offered dynamic and democratic interpretations of Islam. The Ikhwan as-Safa (Brethren of Purity) movement, around the tenth century, demonstrated one such open-minded approach to religious and political affairs in Islam's early centuries. The Rasa'il (Letters) of the Brethren is the first known Islamic encyclopedia, containing a significant collection of the sciences and traditions of that era. Its authors tried diligently to remain anonymous, doubtless to protect themselves from dictatorial rulers. Lengthy chapters in the Rasa'il demonstrate that its authors paid particular attention to Muslims' social plight, trying to identify reasons for the moral bankruptcy and submission to despotic systems. The Ikhwan as-Safa lashed out at "worldly tyrants," urging respect for the liberty and free will of the faithful. Throughout the work, the emphasis was on knowledge and awareness as the requirements for salvation in the material world and hereafter. The essays of the Ikhwan as-Safa reflected a commitment to the spread of scientific knowledge among the ordinary people. At the time, science commonly meant knowledge of the religion, but the Ikhwan as-Safa also promulgated worldly sciences and education because the authors believed that science was worthwhile only if it served practical purposes. They perceived a bright future for humanity and reiterated the return of tranquility to the world: "Although destructive elements such as wars, calamities and havoc occur, causing the ruin of some cities and retardation of development and prosperity among some nations, they ultimately lead towards a more desirable situation and well-being."14
In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, a series of anti-despotic Shi'ah movements emerged in various parts of Iran. The most prominent among them was the Sarbedaran movement, active during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in north and northeastern Iran. Founded by Sheikh Khalifa Mazandarani, the Sarbedaran (meaning in Farsi "those hanged" or "the self-sacrificers") rebelled against the ruling system and fanatic jurists who legitimized the oppressive rule of the local sultans. The clergy soon took advantage of its privileges, issuing a decree sentencing Sheikh Khalifa to death for apostasy, a common fate for advocates of new ideas or liberty. He was subsequently hanged in the courtyard of a mosque in Sabzevar, Khorassan Province.
After Sheikh Khalifa's death, one of his disciples, Hassan Jowri, continued to disseminate his ideas, secretly organizing traders and peasants for a revolt against the ruling system. The Sarbedaran's influence gradually spread. They defeated the sultan's forces, conquering large parts of Iran and ruling for many years. Compared to contemporary regimes, the people enjoyed more peace and freedom under the Sarbedaran, whose sovereigns had seized power out of antagonism towards fundamentalist Islam and after defeating despots and the clergy supporting them. Hafiz Abru, a famous fifteenth-century Iranian historian, writes in his works about the prosperity of Khorassan's Beihaq region under the Sarbedaran, noting that the town of Sabzevar, the Sarbedaran's capital, had become one of Iran's largest and most prosperous cities.
Shi'ism in Safavid and Post-Safavid Iran
The spread of popular Shi'ite movements opposing fanaticism and fundamentalism continued elsewhere in Iran after the Sarbedaran. Upon assuming power, the Safavid dynasty (1502-1736) adopted a new approach, intended both to impede these movements' growth and consolidate the ruling regime. Shi'ism was declared Iran's official religion, thereby allowing the Safavid rulers to legitimize their dictatorial rule and interests under a religious cloak. Shi'ism also provided a powerful element of national identity at a time when the Safavids were facing an eastward drive by the Ottoman rulers to expand their empire. The reactionary Shi'ite clergy allied itself with the shahs, and for the first time Shi'ite jurists who espoused fanatic positions became the apparatus of the official church. Not only did they legitimize attacks on the Sunnis, but also sanctioned the brutal suppression of antifundamentalist Shi'ites and advocates of freedom. In this context, this era of Iran's history can be compared with Khomeini's rule. Tens of thousands were killed for their religious beliefs or political tendencies.
According to historians, philosophers and libertarians were not the only ones despised and oppressed under the Safavid reign; the Sufis, who for the most part were open-minded and enlightened, were also targets of the kings' wrath. Meanwhile, the number and influence of the dogmatic clerics increased. During Shah Abbas's reign, the campaign to eradicate the Sufis' influence was so harsh that in just thirty years, three centuries of general affection toward the Sufis gave way to prejudice and violence. Mullah Muhammad Baqir Majlisi, a notorious cleric at Shah Abbas's Court (1588-1629), issued fatwas (decrees) for the Sufis' murder. The reign of terror denied that era's greatest philosophers, such as Mir Damad and Molla Sadra, the opportunity to express their social and philosophical views openly.
The Safavid sultans benefited greatly from the dogmatic clerics in maintaining their grip on power. For their part, the mullahs were granted special privileges which kept them quite satisfied with the status quo. The demise of Iranian literature, arts, and the sciences accelerated as the theocracy imposed its dark rule on society.
During the reign of the Qajar monarchs (1786-1925), the reactionary clerics continued in the footsteps of their predecessors in the Safavid era. Haji Molla Ali Kani, a senior cleric and a big landowner during the reign of Naser od-Din Shah (ruled 1847-96), opposed any intellectual or social progress under the banner of defending Islam. In one of his personal letters to Naser od-Din Shah, he expressed his abhorrence at the "despicable word 'freedom.'" Naser od-Din Shah and Molla Kani feared that with the penetration of such ideas as democracy and the advancement of public awareness, the people would no longer submit to absolute dictatorship. Their concern was well founded.
During the Qajar period, the influence of reactionary mullahs steadily increased within the ruling apparatus. The situation became so extreme that mullahs began to preach that God created the Westerners to work and provide what is needed so that Muslims can pray with peace of mind. He had given the material world to Westerners and set aside the Hereafter for the Muslims.
Haj Mirza Nasrollah Malik ol-Motekallemin was among those clerics who rebelled against the ruling despotic regime and the reactionary clergy supporting it. The king ordered him arrested and put to death in Tehran in 1905. In his book Royaye Sadeqeh (Truthful Dreams) in 1897, Malik ol-Motekallemin used the device of a dream to illustrate the unbridled corruption plaguing the clerical establishment in Iran. Addressing Aqa Najafi, his contemporary and one of the most influential reactionary clerics, he wrote:
On what equitable terms did you marry hundreds of 10 to 12 year-old virgins to satisfy your lust, and then let these poor souls go after a short while of pleasure, forcing them into prostitution and begging? For what reason did you prohibit the study of divine philosophy and brand theologians infidels? According to which religion or Shari'ah did you label modem schools the houses of Satan and their founders apostates and non-believers, declaring the adherents of these sacred principles faithless blasphemers and the shedding of their blood legitimate?15
Iran's Constitutional Revolution of 1906
The 1906 Constitutional Revolution stands out in Iran's modem history as an illustration of intense confrontations between the two conflicting interpretations of Islam - one democratic and the other dogmatic. By the end of the nineteenth century, a combination of factors - an influx of Western culture, establishment of publishing houses, increase in trade with the outside world, merchants' travels, dispatch of students to Europe, and publication of books describing the tremendous scientific and industrial advances in Europe-gradually set Iranian society in motion. Popular protests against the absolute monarchy gained momentum in the form of demonstrations and sit-ins in various cities. Eventually, Muzaffar od-Din Shah signed the Constitutional Decree in 1906, transforming the ruling system, at least on the surface, into a constitutional monarchy.
The constitutional movement found Muslim jurists and clerics in opposing camps. The majority advocated the status quo, opposed any reform, and backed the shah. A powerful minority of liberal-minded and democratic clerics, however, favored the establishment of a parliamentary government and the realization of democratic rights.
The fanatic mullahs were led by Sheikh Fadhlullah Nuri, whom Khomeini revered as a role model. Faced with a nationwide constitutional movement, Nuri insisted that all laws take effect only after they were reviewed and confirmed by a group of clergymen. Seventy years later, Khomeini incorporated exactly the same principle in the constitution of his own regime, appointing a Council of Guardians to confirm or reject legislation.
Sheikh Fadhlullah Nuri was profoundly reactionary. Admonishing Iranians in the early years of the century for beginning to pick up the "evil" habit of reading newspapers, he declared:
Today, your senses and perceptions have changed, so much so that you read newspapers. Now you relish socializing with Westerners and atheists. Shame on you, Muslims, for thinking that reading these newspapers has been a source of your progress and perception, for spending your wife and children's money on newspapers, and for dissociating yourselves from Islam and the ulema (religious scholars) to the point that it seems as if you have never shared the same faith as theirs.
Of course, Sheikh Fadhlullah Nuri and the like had concrete reasons to fear a constitutional government and to defend the status quo; each of these mullahs was among the wealthiest and biggest landowners in Iran. Conversely, clergymen such as Seyyed Muhammad Tabataba'i, Seyyed Abdullah Behbahani, and Seyyed Jamal od-Din Va'iz, basing their views on the teachings of the Quran and Islam, defended the right to popular suffrage and considered a constitutional government indispensable. A number of progressive clerics, including Seyyed Jamal od-Din Va'iz and Aqa Mirza Ali Seqat ol-Islam e-Tabrizi, were assassinated by the ruling regime in the course of the Constitutional Revolution.
Other clerical authors of this era, citing the genuine teachings of Islam, refuted the reactionary mullahs' rationale for their opposition to freedom and constitutional system. One of the most invaluable works in this field is Tanbihol Umma va Tanzihol Millah (Raising the People's Awareness and Purifying the Ideology), a treatise by Ayatollah Mirza Hussein Na'ini, a senior Shi'ite cleric of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In this treatise, Na'ini elaborates the argument that from a Shi'ite perspective, a constitutional regime is essential.
The confrontation between the democratic constitutionalists and the reactionary dogmatists of the early years continued throughout the first half of the twentieth century. A turning point came in the early 1950s. Dr. Muhammad Mossadeq, leader of the Iranian nationalist movement who had nationalized the oil industry, became prime minister in 1951. During his tenure, however, his conflict with the dictatorship of Shah Muhammad-Reza Pahlavi reached a climax. Twenty-seven months later, on August 19, 1953, a coup ousted Mossadeq and restored the shah's rule.
The most significant domestic factor in the failure of Iran's nationalist movement was the antagonism of an unholy alliance of anti-Mossadeq forces, ranging from the pro-Moscow Communists to the fundamentalist mullahs, led by Ayatollah Abolqassem Kashani. An associate of Kashani, Khomeini was heavily involved in the fanatic mullahs' conspiracies against Mossadeq's government. After seizing power in 1979, Khomeini recalled: "In those same years in the 1950s, I told the Aqa [Kashani] that Mossadeq would be slapped in the face. And it did not take long before he was slapped. Had he survived, he would have slapped Islam."16
After the 1979 revolution, Hassan Ayat, one of Khomeini's close confidants and a founder of the now defunct Islamic Republic Party, wrote a book, entitled The True Visage of Mossadeq ol-Saltaneh, in which he said: "History attests that in contemporary Iranian history, the clergy and Islam were never so insulted as during Mossadeq's rule. One is ashamed to repeat such insults."17 The vengeful attitude of Kashani, Khomeini, and their clique toward Mossadeq contrasts sharply with the view of figures like the late Ayatollah Seyyed Mahmoud Taleqani, loyal supporter of Mossadeq who criticized the policies adopted by the reactionary mullahs against the nationalist leader. Twenty-five years later, Taleqani was one of the key figures in the antimonarchic revolution that toppled the shah. He warned against the monopoly of power by the fanatic mullahs, led by Khomeini, and reiterated that "dictatorship under the cloak of religion" is the worst form of tyranny. Taleqani passed away a few months after the revolution, never living to see his prediction realized, the return of dictatorship in the guise of religion.18
The Feda'ian-e-Islam was among the most fanatic religious sects of the Mossadeq era and was rewarded with a significant share in the ruling hierarchy after Khomeini's rise to power. Founded by Mojtaba Navvab Safavi, the Feda'ian-e-Islam became active after World War II. From 1945 to 1963, its members carried out a series of political assassinations, whose targets included not only government officials but also many whom the group considered apostates or renegades. Ahmad Kasravi, the prolific Iranian historian and author, and Dr. Hussein Fatemi, Mossadeq's deputy and foreign minister, were among the victims. The Feda'iane-Islam's dogmatic and superficial interpretation of the Quran and Islamic teachings-similar in many respects to that of the early Kharajites-transformed the group into an armed gang of fanatics advocating blind terror. Their ideology lacked a cohesive or well-defined interpretation of Islam and disdained rational criteria. On Khomeini's orders, Sadeq Khalkhali, an activist of the Feda'ian-e-Islam, was appointed "religious judge of the Islamic Revolutionary Courts" after the shah's downfall. His extensive use of the death penalty earned him the nickname "the Hanging Judge." Khalkhali later acknowledged he was acting under Khomeini's personal decree. Like all of Khomeini's religious judges, Khalkhali used the terms "waging war on God and His Messenger" and "corruption on Earth," in passing sentences on the accused, whether political dissidents or people charged with armed robbery or drug trafficking. Khomeini and Khalkhali's use of such religious justifications for their crimes distorted the religion of compassion and liberty, violating the spirit of the Prophet when he declared a general amnesty upon conquering Mecca. The religious and legal interpretations of the judicial concepts of "corruption on Earth" and "waging war on God and His Messenger," developed by Islamic schools of thought and scientists, were disregarded. Instead, the regime's religious judges adopted a wholly formalistic application of the terms to justify the execution and physical elimination of their opponents, the Muslim Mojahedin and other political opponents. This dogmatic approach by Khomeini and the Feda'ian-e-Islam was essentially the same. After Khomeini seized power, it was applied to the whole of society, with calamitous consequences.
Throughout Islamic history confrontation has not been limited to the differences between the Shi'ah and Sunni; the pivotal conflict has been between dogmatic (fundamentalist) Islam and dynamic (modernist) Islam. Whether in the cloak of a ruler or a clergyman, there have always been individuals or groups who have misused and manipulated Islam to protect their own material interests or to legitimize their rule. Opposing them, however, have been persons and movements who earnestly strove to realize the genuine essence of Islam - emancipation from the chains of servitude and material well-being.
Among the Sunni philosophers of the past century who fought against fanaticism and dogmatism, Abdur, Rahman Al-Kawakibi ( 18491902) was particularly prominent. Al-Kawakibi was born in the Syrian city of Aleppo (Halab). At the age of 20, he published the city's first Arabic magazine, which featured articles critical of the autocracy of Ottoman Sultan Abdulhamid, and he defended the political rights of the people of Syria. The Turkish governor of Aleppo soon shut down the publication, but Al-Kawakibi produced two masterpieces, Tabaye' ol-Istibdad (Nature of Despotism) and Umm ol-Qura (The Mother of AU Lands). Tabaye' ol-Istibdad rapidly became famous among both Arab and non, Arab Muslim readers. During Iran's 1906 Constitutional Revolution, the book was translated into Farsi and distributed in the country, where it had considerable influence on Iranian intellectuals.
Tabaye' ol-Istibdad is a treatise on Ottoman despotism, upon which the caliphate was based and which Khomeini called his model. Al-Kawakibi defined despotism as "an unbridled rule which arbitrarily confiscates any aspect of the life of the serf without fear of being questioned." He rebuked the Sunni jurists who believed despotism could coexist with the Shari' ah, their maxim being, "sixty years under a despot is better than one night without a ruler." Al-Kawakibi argued, "A despot rules over the lives of the people, not according to their will or religious beliefs, but according to his own. He knows that he is a usurper and an invader. He therefore tramples upon the mouths of millions of people to silence them and deny them the chance to speak or demand the truth."19 According to Al-Kawakibi, despots have always taken advantage of religion to consolidate their rule. He concluded that "no despot has ever adopted a holy image except for himself and in order to share in God's authority."2O The Quran, he wrote, exhorts us to safeguard equality and freedom. Referring to verses from the Quran, he emphasized counsel and councils even at the highest levels of government, and the need for parliamentary, representative rule.
In the Tabaye' ol-Istibdad, Al-Kawakibi revealed another aspect of progressive Islamic thought in his approach to religious minorities. Addressing the non-Muslim Arabs, he wrote:
Dear fellow Arabs - and I am hereby referring to those whose language is Arabic but who are not Muslims - I invite you to forget the wrongdoings and your rancor and forgive whatever our fathers and ancestors have done. . . . Let us have mercy on each other, help each other in hardships, and in accordance with "indeed, the believers are brothers," be equal in times of happiness.21
Al-Kawakibi's invitation to forget "wrongdoings and rancors" is in reference to the nineteenth-century wars between the Christians and Muslims in Lebanon. He underlined the spirit of religious tolerance so conspicuous in the words, deeds, and teachings of the Prophet of Islam and so hysterically opposed by the dogmatists.
Although a prominent example, Al-Kawakibi is by no means alone among antifundamentalist scholars. Seyyed Jamalod-Din Assad Abadi (1838-1897), one of the nineteenth century's most renowned Muslim leaders, and the famous Egyptian scholar and reformist Muhammad Abdoh (1849-1905) also played significant roles in exposing the dogmatists and reactionaries. Seyyed Jamalod-Din was at the forefront of the struggle against the absolute dictatorship of the Qajar king, Naserod-Din Shah, in Iran. He relentlessly strove to enlighten the public and expose the corrupt, reactionary mullahs, whose efforts were wholly focused on providing religious justification for the corruption and atrocities of the shah and his court. Refuting the distortions which tainted Islam with ignorance, Seyyed Jamalod-Din called for a return to the authentic sources of Islamic thought and urged the Islamic world to learn the new sciences.
He was imprisoned in Istanbul on the orders of the Ottoman caliph, Abdulhamid, and died in prison.
In sum, the historical confrontation we are addressing is not between the Shi'ah and Sunni, but between the advocates of reaction and the advocates of freedom and democracy in both branches of Islam. From this perspective, Khomeini's predecessors are found not only among the dogmatic Shi'ite mullahs of the Middle-Ages in Iran, but also under the cloaks of the Ottoman caliphs and the backward jurists of the Dark Ages of Islam.
Khomeini was the first ruler of a Muslim state since 1258 - the year of the conquest of Baghdad by the Mongol ruler Hulagu Khan - to wield both political and religious power. A master of demagogy, he committed atrocities in the name of Islam. Not even the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphs had ever simultaneously held both political and religious powers. In the case of the Ottoman sultans, non - Turkish jurists and clerics never recognized their claims as legitimate. Before Khomeini and his entourage seized power in Iran, the clerical apparatus was always secondary and subordinate to the royal court and ruling regime, basically acting to legitimize the tyranny in power. Under Khomeini, however, the reactionary clerical apparatus actually rose to power. For this reason, the magnitude of the tyranny taking place over the past fourteen years in Iran is unparalleled in the nation's history. No other so-called Muslim tyrant had ever shed the blood of so many Muslims, especially the Mojahedin.
In studying the history of Islam, it is clear that the fundamentalists were always defeated by the school of religious thought that advocated democracy, opposed dogmatism and zealotry, and relied on its faith in the exalted values upon which Islam is based. Religious reactionaries have always managed to use demagogy to parry attacks by nationalists and other secular philosophers, thereby preserving their sway. They have no weapon but brute force and repression to confront the genuine Islamic ideologies, which expose their distortion and abuse of the religion.
